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This thesis examines how U.S.-Nigerian relations can be optimized to reduce the growing 
insecurity in Nigeria and reestablish Nigeria in the strategic calculus of ensuring Africa’s 
regional stability. It analyzes why U.S. security programs are not achieving their desired 
outcomes despite increased U.S. assistance. It also assesses the 2012 U.S. Strategy for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and U.S. security programs with respect to Nigeria’s security 
challenges. The thesis reveals that poor outcomes are not due to program-problem 
mismatch, but due to the U.S. bureaucratic bottlenecks in Washington and the incapacity 
of the Nigerian security agencies. The underlying causes of insecurity in Nigeria, such as 
low literacy rates, poverty, and weak institutions, also impinge on the program. The 
remedies lie in repositioning Nigeria’s security agencies and building Nigeria’s 
institutions to address the underlying causes of insecurity. The U.S. government also 
needs to prioritize its humanitarian programs to address more specific problems.  
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Christopher Cruz et al. contend that “Nigeria is critical to ensure U.S. prosperity 
and security for two key reasons: economic interests and regional influence. Nigeria’s 
massive population, growing economy, and wealth of natural resources provide a vast 
opportunity for expanded cooperation.”1 Nigeria is also one of the recipients of the 
highest amount of U.S. aid in Africa,2 totaling nearly $600 million annually since 2011. 
More broadly, Nigeria is a major oil supplier to the United States, providing 53 percent of 
U.S. oil imports from Africa—which translates to about 8 percent of all U.S. oil imports 
globally.3 As of 2011, U.S. imports from Nigeria under the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) total about $31 billion, and the balance of trade for 2014 is 
estimated at $52.9 million.4 This thesis explores options for improving U.S.-Nigerian 
relations and bolstering Nigeria’s capacity to pursue its national and regional security 
imperatives, including peace, stability, and prosperity within a democratizing framework. 
Nigeria faces myriad security crises, including militancy, terrorism, piracy and 
sea robbery, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. Boko Haram5 terrorists have not only 
overwhelmed Nigeria’s security apparatus, but have openly threatened the United States. 
The abduction in April 2014 of some 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria, 
1 Christopher A. Cruz, Aaron A. Bazin, and Charles E, Hewins, “Ensuring U.S. Prosperity and 
Security: The Case for Nigeria,” Small Wars (August 18, 2013). http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/
art/ensuring-us-prosperity-and-security-the-case-for-nigeria. 
2 Lauren Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. RL.33964) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 20. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33964.pdf. 
3 Vivian C. Jones, U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with SSA and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (CRS Report No. RL31772) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 8. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf. Oil is not the only commodity of interest. 
According to the government of Nigeria, “Cocoa, bauxite and aluminum, tobacco and waxes, rubber, and 
grains constituted about $73 million of U.S. imports from Nigeria in 2010.” Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
“Nigeria Natural Resources,”(2014). http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46/2012-11-05-09-52-
15. 
4 United States Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Nigeria,” U.S. Department of Commerce, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7530.html.; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: 
Standard Country Report Nigeria” (September, 30, 2012), http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/
do?_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&submit=submit&output=2&unit=R&cocode=6NGA. 
5 Boko Haram is a terrorist group located in northeastern Nigeria, but it is responsible for violent 
killings across the country. Its goal is to establish Islamic law in northern Nigeria. Chapter II discusses 
Boko Haram in more detail. 
1 
has provoked international condemnation.6 Such outrages not only threaten the stability 
of Nigeria, but also its ability to function as an anchor state in West Africa—and, thus, 
also affect the interests of the United States.7 
The United States has taken steps to help Nigeria address these security problems. 
The U.S. worldwide threat assessment of January 2014 holds that Nigeria’s security 
forces are more reactive than proactive; Nigeria lacks the capability to combat its 
numerous security challenges.8 For example, U.S. Marines were deployed in the first 
week of May 2014 to advise Nigeria on intelligence and training.9 Such intensive U.S.-
Nigerian engagement is unusual;10 typical exchanges include training assistance and 
capacity-building programs under the auspices of Africa Contingency Operations 
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and AFRICOM. ACOTA’s main purpose is to build 
the capacity of partner countries in humanitarian and peace-support operations.11 
AFRICOM’s programs include the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 
and maritime programs and exercises such as the African Partnership Station (APS). 
Nigeria has participated in APS exercises such as Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS, 
aimed at building capabilities in counter-piracy and maritime-law enforcement. Nigeria 
has also benefited from the U.S. maritime-domain awareness system—a regional 
maritime-awareness capability system installed to enable Nigeria to monitor its maritime 
domain in the Gulf of Guinea against piracy and other transnational maritime crimes. 
The overarching question at issue in the present research is: why are increased 
U.S. security initiatives and programs not translating to improved security and stability in 
Nigeria? Specifically, what are the drivers of Nigeria’s insecurity, and how do they 
6 Amy Klobuchar, “U.S. Needs to Help Effort to Bring Back Kidnapped Girls,” CNN World, May 9, 
2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/09/opinion/klobuchar-nigerian-girls/. 
7 James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, 
DC: ODNI, 2014), 20. 
8 Ibid. 
9 U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, “Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to 
Nigeria,” May 14, 2014, http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/factsheet_05142014.html. 
10 Donald Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” SAIS Review 21 (2001): 179. 
11 Stuttgart U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, Germany, “Africa Contingency Operations Training 
and Assistance (ACOTA),” in Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)(2008), 5. 
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hinder U.S. security initiatives? Finally, what gaps or challenges in U.S.-Nigerian 
relations must be addressed to allow progress?  
A. OVERVIEW OF U.S.-NIGERIAN RELATIONS: LOOKING BACK, 
LOOKING FORWARD 
Despite the huge trade between the countries and a common interest in African 
stability, U.S.-Nigerian relations have weathered several lows, especially during military 
regimes that ran counter to the core principles of American foreign policy. One 
consequence of the last military regime, under General Sani Abacha in the 1990s, was the 
cancellation of all U.S. military assistance and training. The return to democracy on May 
29, 1999, brought a renewed partnership as the ban on aid to the Nigerian military and 
other security agencies was lifted.12 Since then, the prosecution of the global war on 
terrorism (GWOT) after 9/11 has opened additional channels for security partnerships 
within the African continent, especially with such anchor states as Nigeria and South 
Africa. One of the products of this partnership was the establishment of AFRICOM.  
The United States formerly encouraged African leaders to maintain friendly 
relations with Europe, especially former colonial masters, rather than seek close, direct 
bonds with the United States.13 Declassified historical documents and memoranda from 
the U.S. Department of State (DOS) reveal that Washington was somewhat standoffish 
with Lagos before Nigeria’s independence on October 1, 1960. For instance, the U.S. 
vice consul at Lagos on June 18, 1952, notes that while the United States does not 
endorse Great Britain’s overseas policy, open U.S. support to Nigeria would not only 
offend the British officials, but could jeopardize the operation of the U.S. consulate 
general in Nigeria.14 Nigeria was not comfortable with the United States because of the 
12 Femi Omotosho, “Governance Crisis and Democracy in Nigeria, 1999‒2012,” Mediterranean 
Journal of Social Sciences 4, no. 14 (2013): 126. Nigeria has experienced a mix of civilian and military 
regimes with more military governments since its independence in 1960. Although the 2014 Freedom 
House report categorizes Nigeria as a partly free democarcy with a score of 4 out of 7, Nigeria’s 
democratization has proceeded consistently since 1999. 
13 Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” 180. 
14 Robert W Ross, “Foriegn Relations of the United States, 1952‒1954,” accessed July 10, 2014, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p1/d111. 
3 
latter’s strong ties to the British colonial government.15 This dilemma was the hallmark 
of the U.S.-Nigerian relations during President Harry Truman’s administration.  
On Nigeria’s attainment of independence, U.S.-Nigerian relations became more 
open and to a large extent detached from the influence of the British officials in Lagos. 
The U.S. Secretary of State announced U.S. recognition of Nigeria in a Voice of America 
radio broadcast, while President Eisenhower wrote a formal letter of recognition to the 
Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on October 2, 1960. Furthermore, the 
Nigerian embassy was officially opened in Washington, DC, and the U.S. embassy in 
Lagos was fully established on October 1, 1960. Prime Minister Balewa also paid an 
official visit to the United States, July 26‒28, 1961, where he addressed a special session 
of the House of Representatives.16 Consequently, U.S.-Nigerian relations took a great 
leap forward, especially in the context of anti-colonialism and the political emancipation 
of African countries. Nigeria became a critical partner in American efforts to curtail 
Soviet activities in newly independent African states; both countries shared a political 
interest in ending South African apartheid as well.17 Additionally, Nigeria expressed it 
willingness to play a leadership role in Africa and requested U.S. support.18 
Soviet support to Patrice Lumumba’s government confirmed the U.S. suspicion of 
a communist takeover of Congo. Thus, the United States supported Colonel Mobutu, who 
staged a coup d’état on September 14, 1960, and expelled the Soviets from Congo. 
Mobutu also orchestrated the arrest and the subsequent assassination of Lumumba on 
January 17, 1960.19 Nigeria provided peacekeeping contingents in Congo, while the 
United States signed a bilateral military agreement with Congo. Furthermore, the United 
States supported the Congolese National Army’s successful operations in the diamond-
15 Ibid. 
16 J. F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “America Welcomes Prime Minister Abubakar 
Balewa of Nigeria, July 1961: 25‒28,” accessed November 14, 2014, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/USG-01-H.aspx  
17 Ibid. 
18 Office of the Historian, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964‒1968,Africa, Document 357,” 
U.S. Department of State, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/ch9. 
19 “The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965,” U.S. Department of State 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2014). 
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rich Katanga.20 Nigeria expressed full support to President Johnson’s policies, and both 
Nigeria and the United States expressed great concern about the failure of the United 
Nations’ (UN) forces in Congo in 1964.21 Nigeria and the United States were also united 
against Soviet and Chinese influence, Portuguese support to the opposition, and France’s 
ineptitude in the Congo crisis.22 
This amity and the policy that grew out of it began to shift in 1967, when the 
Nigerian Civil War began. The period also marked the end of President Johnson’s 
administration and the beginning of President Nixon’s administration in 1968, which 
heralded a growing rift between the American president and his State Department. The 
United States was sympathetic to Biafra23 and U.S. officials admired its leader 
Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu. For example, the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria at the time, 
Elbert G Mathews writes, “We like romantic leaders, and Ojukwu has panache, quick 
intelligence, and an actor’s voice and fluency.”24 The United States rhetorically 
maintained a neutral stand in the conflict but undertook to provide aid and arms to the 
Biafrans through private vendors and the Red Cross.25 The major low points were the 
United States’ refusal to sell 106mm ammunition to Nigeria for the same rifles procured 
from the United States, and the U.S. government’s disregard of Nigeria’s request to 
terminate aid to Biafra.26 Furthermore, the U.S. press supported Biafra, and the U.S. 
government made a public pronouncement against the Soviet supply of arms to Nigeria.27 
20 Alexis Arieff, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. 
R43166) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 4‒5; Moses E.U. Tedheke, 
“Theoretical and Doctrinal Foundations of Nigeria’s Peace Support Operations – a Critique,” IOSR Journal 
of Humanities and Social Science 6, no. 1 (2012). 
21 Office of Historian, “Africa Document 357.” 
22 U.S. Department of State, “The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965.” 
23 Biafra was the name given to southern eastern Nigeria before the declaration of its secession from 
Nigeria in 1967, which led to the Nigeria Civil War. The main cause of the conflict is the ethnic dichotomy 
and power sharing problems in the central government.  
 24 Egbert G Mathews, “Foriegn Relations of the United States, Africa, Document 395,” U.S. State 
Department: Office of the Historian, accesed June 16, 2014, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1964-68v24/d395. 
 25 Ibid., 2. 
 26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Ibid. 
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Consequently, the Nigerian government and most Nigerians saw U.S. actions as a breach 
of trust and confidence.   
Suspicion and misunderstanding characterized the Ford administration’s 
relationship with Nigeria after the civil war, a legacy of the fractious years leading up to 
this period in both countries. Nigeria perceived the United States as indifferent toward its 
plight and decided to meet any U.S. initiatives and gestures with dismissive skepticism.28 
The United States, on the other hand, sought to avoid disaffecting Nigeria further.29 
Hence, the relations were focused on confidence-building measures especially from the 
standpoint of the United Sates anti-communist Cold War policy in Africa. 
The repressive General Sani Abacha administration in the 1990s marked another 
low in U.S.-Nigerian relations. The United State was already upset with General 
Babangida’s annulment of the 1993 presidential elections, which returned Moshood 
Abiola as the president-elect. General Abacha’s ousting of the interim government in 
November 1993 not only denied Nigeria a first democratic transition after a long period 
of military rule but also further damaged U.S.-Nigerian relations. The regime clamped 
down and jailed many pro-democracy activists, including the president-elect. 
Furthermore, the trial and execution of a world-renowned writer, Ken Saro Wiwa, and 
eight others appalled the world.30  
Since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, relations between the two nations 
have improved over the years through President Obasanjo’s, Yar A’ Dua, and now 
Jonathan’s administrations.31 According to John Campbell, a former U.S. ambassador to 
Nigeria, “The positive relations are largely based on our parallel interests since the end of 
the civil war: African regional stability through conflict prevention or resolution and 
 28 Office of the Historian, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973‒1976, Africa, Document 
200,” U.S. Department of State, accesssed July 18, 2014, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969-76ve06/d200. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Cece Modupe Fadope, “Nigeria,” Foriegn Policy in Focus, January 1, 1997, http://fpif.org/nigeria/. 
31 Smart Uhakheme, Nigeria- U.S. Relations: Perspective on Political Change in Africa (Maryland: 
UPA, 2008), 12; John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2013), 143. 
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addressing public health challenges, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria.”32 Since the 
inception of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program in 
2004, Nigeria has received more than $3.4 billion to combat the AIDS epidemic.33 
Among other efforts, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) commissioned HIV testing 
and counseling centers at the 44 Nigerian Army Reference Hospitals in 2007, and the 
Defense Reference Laboratory, Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja, in 2012.34 
Security cooperation has also been on the increase. Between 2003 and 2014, the 
United States transferred six decommissioned Coast Guard vessels to Nigeria under the 
U.S. Excess Defense Articles program. The last was the cutter Gallatin, transferred to the 
Nigerian Navy in May 2014.35 Despite such exchanges, total U.S. military assistance to 
Nigeria was reduced from $11.1 million in 2011 to $4.9 in 2012.36 Still, Nigeria tries to 
lead the West African sub-region in security and stability, though its own internal-
security problems may contradict or undermine this role. In the 1990s, for example, 
Nigeria played a leading role in regional peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. Nigeria also intervened and restored democracy in Sao Tome and Principe after 
the coup d’état of July 16, 2003.37  
B. JUST OUT OF REACH: UNMET POLICY GOALS 
For all of this involvement and these shared goals, U.S.-Nigerian cooperation has 
not yielded the outcomes desired, especially in terms of Nigeria’s role in maintaining 
32 Campbell, Nigeria, 143.  
33 United Sates Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, “U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief,” 
accessed July 18, 2014, http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/pepfar.html. 
34 U.S. Military HIV Research Program, “New Defense Reference Laboratory Commissioned in 
Nigeria,” accessed August 2, 2014,, http://www.hivresearch.org/news.php?NewsID=249; “U.S. DOD HIV 
Program – Nigeria Collaborates on New HIV/AIDS Center in Kaduna,” DOD, accessed August 3, 2014, 
https://www01.hjf.org/apps/internet/hivnewscenter.nsf/newsmainlistview/
5F1725FEA858EF8F852572EB0050020A. 
35 Linda M. Johnson, “U.S. Coast Guard Transfers High Endurance Cutters Hamilton and Chase to the 
Philippines and Nigeria,” USCG Acquisition Directorate, http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/
CG9newsletterMay11.pdf. 
36 USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Standard Country Report Nigeria.” 
37 Joao Gomes Porto, “Coup D’état in São Tomé and Príncipe,” African Security Review 12, no. 4 
(2003): 34. 
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effective regional influence. Nigeria’s current security challenges have frustrated its 
ability to fulfill foreign-policy imperatives, as when Nigeria withdrew from a 
peacekeeping mission in Mali in July 2013 to shore up counterterrorism efforts against 
Boko Haram in the northeast.38 The April 14, 2014, Abuja bombing, coinciding with the 
abduction of 276 schoolgirls in Borno State, casts doubt on Nigeria’s ability to counter 
terrorism on its own.39 Similarly, piracy and oil theft are severely damaging Nigeria’s 
economy and international maritime trade. In the Gulf of Guinea, pirate attacks increased 
from 39 in 2010 to 64 in 2013. Compounding Nigeria’s economic losses, about $4 
million in crude oil is stolen daily.40  
The mounting complexity of Nigeria’s situation has moved the United States to 
pursue new channels of cooperation. For example, the U.S.-Nigerian Bi-National 
Commission, launched in April 2014, focuses on four key areas: good governance, 
security cooperation, energy reform, and food-security/agricultural development.41 In 
2011, then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted, “We will stand with Nigeria as 
it faces serious security issues. The bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja last month 
was a horrific and cowardly act, and we want to work with Nigeria and West Africa to 
improve security and to make sure that we also address the legitimate needs of people 
before extremists have a chance to exploit them.”42 Despite this pledge in 2011, the 
situation has worsened; clearly, U.S. policies are not achieving their intended outcomes.  
38 Information Nigeria, “Mali: Nigerian Troops Withdrawal Begins Today,” Information Nigeria, July 
2013, http://www.informationng.com/2013/07/mali-nigerian-troops-withdrawal-begins-today-2.html. Boko 
Haram is one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, with a record of 801 attacks and 3,666 fatalities from 
2009–2013. Global Terrorism Database, “Terrorists Incidents in Nigeria,” University of Maryland, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=nigeria&sa.x=55&sa.y=10&sa=Search. They 
operate along Nigeria’s northeastern border, beside the Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon, a mostly 
ungoverned region that provides easy sanctuary. 
39 IHS, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Nigeria Security,” accessed July 4, 2014, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?ItemId=1302710. 
40 Barbara Starr and Catherine E. Shoichet, “2 Seized in Pirate Attack off Nigeria, U.S. Official Says,” 
CNN, October 24, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/africa/nigeria-vessel-attack/index.html; 
Talatu Usman, “Nigeria Loses N640 Million Daily to Crude Oil Theft - Official,” Premium Times, January 
3, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201401031051.html. 
41U.S. Department of State, “Signing Ceremony for the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission,” 
accesssed July 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/04/139571.htm.  
42 U.S. State Department, “Remarks with Nigerian Foreign Minister Olugbenga Ashiru after Their 
Meeting,” September 29, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/09/174818.htm. 
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Three reasons for this failure emerge. First, existing programs do not necessarily 
fit the target problems. The symptoms of dysfunction and disorder are typically 
addressed, not root causes, and problems may be misdiagnosed or badly generalized by 
U.S. agencies, as typically when the American perception of security needs differs 
markedly from the reality experienced by Africans. For instance, the United Sates wanted 
to provide two sophisticated video cameras to the Mauritanian security agencies at 
$10,000 each, but dialogue with the Mauritanians led to the procurement of different 
cameras, which are easy to use and maintained at about $1,100 each.43 Additionally, the 
drivers of insecurity, such as weak government institutions, poverty, material inequality, 
and ethnic rivalry in Nigeria, may hamper program effectiveness.44For example, poverty 
and weak law enforcement enhances Islamic radicalization despite counterterrorism 
efforts. 
Second, even when a program fits the problem, a lack of necessary equipment and 
platforms among Nigerian security agencies may render the program ineffective. Among 
the capability gaps commonly found are a lack of a robust intelligence infrastructure and 
inadequate land, air, and surface platforms.45 Finally, the conflicting roles and missions 
of U.S. agencies administering aid and U.S. bureaucrats enforcing inflexible policies such 
as “no boots on ground” can have detrimental effects—for example, the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda.46  
43 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa 
Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014), 27. 
44 I.C Achumba, O. S. Ighomereho, and M. O. M. Akpor-Robaro, “Security Challenges in Nigeria and 
the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development,” Journal of Economics and 
Sustainable Development 4, no. 2 (2013): 81‒82. 
45 Andre Le Sage, “Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement,” Strategic 
Forum no. 255 (2010): 8‒9. 
46 Rory Carroll, “ U.S. Choose to Ignore Rwandan Genocide,” theguardian.com, March 31, 2004, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature on U.S.-Africa relations has enjoyed significant augmentation 
within the last three decades.47 Most scholars have focused on general areas of common 
interest, such as economy, politics, and security. What has not been explored is the 
effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy initiatives in curbing Nigeria’s security problems, 
particularly terrorism, piracy, and oil theft. This review focuses on discussion of why 
some programs do not fit target problems, the inability of Nigerian security agencies to 
execute programs that fit, and the effect of U.S. bureaucratic inflexibility on program 
effectiveness. It also discusses how to address root causes and symptoms.  
1. Programs-Problems Mismatch 
Many scholars have argued that U.S. policy in Africa has a one-size-fits-all 
approach that does not substantially help Africa’s security problems. For example, 
Princeton Lyman argues that the United States focuses more on humanitarian and moral 
concerns than on security, and contends that though humanitarian assistance is important, 
it does not effectively support the multifaceted U.S. interests in the continent. He 
emphasizes a need to balance human-security and state-security programs to achieve the 
desired objectives.48 
Others point to the fact that U.S. approaches emphasize irrelevant aspects of 
security challenges. Carl LeVan criticizes the DOD’s environmental programs as a faulty 
diagnosis of Africa’s security problems—for example, arguing that DOD studies and 
simulation exercises on the environment should not be a priority in Africa. An example is 
AFRICOM’s seminar on environmental preservation, held in Cape Verde—typical of a 
program irrelevant to security problems.49  
47 Kofi Nsia-Pepra, “Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain or Backlash?” 
Military Review (2014). 
48 Princeton N. Lyman, “Strategic Approach to Terrorism,” in Africa-U.S. Relations, ed. Donald 
Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2006), 49. 
49 Carl LeVan, “The Political Economy of African Responses to the U.S. Africa Command,” Africa 
Today 57, no. 1 (2010): 19. 
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Others point to an excessive U.S. focus on symptoms, notably terrorism, rather 
than causes. This misplaced emphasis means that security programs will never stem the 
challenges; it merely helps countries to manage them. Guy Lamb notes that the practice 
forces African governments to use their scarce resources for counterterrorism rather than 
addressing the causes of insecurity, for example, poverty and illiteracy. Not only does 
such an approach provide only a short-term solution, but in the longer run it may actually 
make matters worse. Lamb argues that the skills acquired from counterterrorism 
initiatives could prove counterproductive, especially when used by a repressive 
government against its people.50 With these characteristics, U.S. programs may end up 
subverting their intended outcomes. 
Serafino et al. note a trend in the DOD toward performing many DOS roles. They 
believe that the GWOT and the increasingly overlapping roles of the DOD are 
undermining the conduct of foreign policy, especially in the soft-power missions of 
governance, education, and development programs, which should be the purview of the 
DOS. Again, this shift emphasizes only the symptoms, thereby weakening the effects of 
programs.51 
2. U.S. Bureaucratic Bottlenecks 
There is much discussion in the literature of U.S. bureaucratic inflexibility. 
Shraeder focuses on the interplay between incrementalism, crisis, and change in U.S. 
policy formulation toward Africa. He contends that U.S. foreign policy toward Africa has 
not been effective because it has been driven by the changing events in Africa. 
Furthermore, he notes: 
The net result of the bureaucratic influence within the policymaking 
process is that the Africa policies of the United States become fragmented, 
interpreted differently, according to the established organizational 
50 Guy Lamb, “Parading U.S. Security Interests as African Security Policy,” Contemporary Security 
Policy 30, no. 1 (2009): 51.  
51 Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towell, Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for 
Missions Abroad (CRS Report No. R42133) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 19. 
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missions of each bureaucracy that historically has been created to deal 
with a particular aspect of foreign policy relations.52 
His sentiments echo the shift in Africa policy from active during the Cold War, 
low-profile after the Cold War, and active again, though on a somewhat different footing, 
after 9/11 for the GWOT. Notably, even the Bureau for African Affairs established by 
DOS in 1958, was not as effective as other regional entities, for example, the Bureau for 
European and Canadian Affairs.53 Issues between Africa and Europe were mostly 
addressed in the European Bureau.54 
Donald Rothchild and Nicholas Emmanuel examine the effect of U.S. domestic 
politics on its engagements in Africa. They observe that with the exception of South 
Africa, Angola, Somalia, and Sudan, the United States faces a dilemma of when to 
intervene in internal problems. Their analysis further shows that American domestic 
politics favors non-military engagements over military programs, and the GWOT has 
further legitimized DOD “non-kinetic missions,” which conflict with the mission of the 
DOS and damage the effectiveness of U.S. security initiatives.55 
The problem of interagency coordination also determines outcomes in U.S. 
security initiatives. For example, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
documents reveal that AFRICOM has no overarching strategy or coordination to its 
multifaceted responsibilities in Africa. Even where a plan is developed, the overlapping 
roles of various agencies tend to thwart positive outcomes, and bottlenecks thwart 
success.56 For example, conflicts between DOD and DOS on which should report to 
52 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foriegn Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change 
(UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 16. 
53 Ibid., 17.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Nikolas Emmanuel and Donald Rothchild, “Intervention in Africa’s Ethnic Conflicts: The Scope for 
Action,” in U.S.-Africa Relations (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2006), 73. 
56 John H. Pendleton, Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD’s Southern and 
Africa Commands (GAO-10-962T ) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 4‒12, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125154.pdf 
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under the TSCTP program affects smooth execution of projects.57 Additionally, 
disagreement between DOS and DOD on the number of DOD personnel to be allowed in 
a country led to the suspension of a DOD program.58  The poor outcomes in the U.S. 
humanitarian assistance at the initial stage of the 2010 Haiti earthquake were blamed on 
poor logistics coordination between agencies.59  
3. Incapacity of Nigeria’s Security Agencies 
An important factor in the effectiveness of any program is the ability to 
institutionalize or execute the program within and by indigenous organizations. Most 
African security agencies have inadequate equipment or lack the capacity to execute 
programs after training. As Ambassador Jonnie Carson observes: 
All the countries in the Sahel face daunting challenges. They are among 
the poorest countries in the world and lack the resources to develop 
effective antiterrorism programs on their own. They are also vast 
countries, stretching over thousands of miles, where government services 
and authority are weak or nonexistent. They are preoccupied with critical 
humanitarian and development issues, and, in some cases, terrorism is not 
their most pressing challenge.60 
Although Nigeria is economically better off than most Sahel countries, it faces the 
same problem of weak governmental services. For instance, the serviceability of 
equipment in the Nigerian armed forces is very low.61 How can such equipment be 
effectively deployed against terrorism or piracy after the U.S. capacity-building program 
is over?  
57 John H. Pendleton, , Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership( GAO-08-860)(Wasington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008), 4, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279056.pdf 
58 Ibid. 
59 Pendleton, Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges, 13. 
60 Subcommitee on African Affairs, Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across 
Africa’s Sahel Region, November 17, 2009, 3, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2009/132082.htm 
61 Jane’s IHS, “Nigerian Armed Forces: Security Assessment,” http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html. 
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4. Addressing Symptoms and Root Causes 
Donald Rothchild distinguishes between state-strategic and human-security 
paradigms in U.S. foreign policy on Africa and captures the gamut of the two approaches 
in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) enhancement model depicted in Figure 1.62 The 
horizontal axis shows the function a specific program is designed to affect, while the 
vertical corresponds to either humanitarian or state-strategic security. 
 
Figure 1.  Sub-Saharan Africa Security Enhancement Model.63 
a. Symptoms  
The state-strategic paradigm is rooted in the realist tradition, which requires states 
to maximize power to protect themselves. It establishes a nexus between U.S. and 
African security, in the sense that weak states might be a breeding ground for terrorists, 
as seen in Afghanistan. Indeed, Africa has many weak and ungoverned states,64 which 
62 Donald Rothchild, “Africa-U.S. Relations: Strategic Encounters,” in Trends in U.S.-Africa 
Relations: Implications for the Future,” ed. Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner, 2006), 248. 
63 Gregory Joachim, “Draining the Swamps or Feeding the Crocodiles in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Orbis 
49, no. 1 (2005): 169. 
64 Ibid. 
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results in lawless activity such as that of Somali pirates in the Horn of Africa, 
necessitating an international response. 
Andre Le Sage stresses: “Engaging African states as reliable partners to confront 
irregular security challenges will be a complex process requiring a three-pronged 
strategy.”65 The first phase entails capacity building in various contingencies for security 
and law enforcement, including media. The second phase requires deployment of U.S. 
personnel in Africa to consolidate the capacities created in phase one, to the level that 
Africans can execute operations on their own. The third phase involves the political will 
of African leadership to deploy their better-prepared security forces while ensuring that 
inculcated best practices and respect for human rights are observed.66 Le Sage calls for a 
comprehensive strategy for engaging with Nigeria, rather than a reactive approach. The 
strategy must include a persistent and coherent U.S. presence until Nigerians can fully 
assume responsibilities.  
John Campbell stresses, “Modest U.S. military overtures in 2009–2010 to provide 
training for the Nigerian Military were a step in the right direction.”67 In the same vein, 
the U.S. deployment of marines to advise in the rescue of the 300 girls abducted on April 
15 reinforces the perception that the United States is committed to partnering with 
Nigeria as an anchor state. This level of assistance reveals that Nigerian security agencies 
still require capacity building and robust intelligence architecture to combat terrorism. 
b. Root Causes  
The human-security paradigm addresses the root causes of insecurity, which 
include urgent humanitarian, socioeconomic, and cultural problems.68 The United States 
focuses on aid and development programs in Africa in response to this model. Some of 
65 Le Sage, “Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement.” 
66 Ibid., 1.  
67 Campbell, Nigeria, 170. 
68 Donald Rothchild, “Trends and Implications for the Future,” in Africa-U.S. Relations, ed. Donald 
Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2006), 252. 
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these programs include the AGOA, the Million Challenge Cooperation, and PEPFAR.69 
Rothchild notes that human-security issues are less selective than state-strategic security 
issues, and for Africa, they must go hand-in-hand to be effective.  
One prevalent idea is that a focus on military responses is too narrow and tends to 
develop programs that are bound to fail. Kofi Nsia Pepra writes: “It would be naïve to 
ignore the relevance of military force in overseas contingency operations, but the United 
States’ failure to address the root causes of the growing insurgency in Africa is also a 
strategic miscalculation.”70 He recommends that the United States work with African 
states to promote good governance, poverty eradication, and prudent use of resources to 
arrest declining state capacities. Nsia-Pepra’s thoughts are relevant, but not novel, 
because they are already enshrined in U.S. foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, some 
scholars like Nsia-Pepra feel that the GWOT has made the United States turn a blind eye 
to some root causes of insecurity. There is a need for a comprehensive U.S. strategy that 
reconciles state-security and humanitarian-security imperatives. 
Gregory Joachim’s conclusion regarding security enhancement is that “programs 
supporting security … functions must be focused on those that strengthen the bond 
between the citizens and their governments. Only the reestablishment of the social 
contract will foster internal security in locations of strategic interests to the United 
States.”71 His sentiments are apt. In Nigeria, if U.S. security programs were not in place, 
the situation would probably be far worse. Nevertheless, tightening the gap between the 
rich and the poor and delivery of public goods will lead to better outcomes for Nigeria. 
The literature features two distinct schools of thought on the effectiveness of U.S. 
foreign-policy initiatives in Africa. One school believes that root causes should receive 
priority; the other supports the hard-power approach. Interestingly, however, both schools 
69 Ted Dagne, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues (CRS Report No. RL33591) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1; Brock R. Williams, “African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA): Background and Reauthorization” (2013); and Mwangi S. Kimenyi Robert Chutha, The Africa 
Growth and Opportunities Act: Toward 2015 and Beyond ‒ A Synthesis of Stakeholder’s Views on the 
Future of U.S.-Africa Commercial Relationships (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2011). 
70 Nsia-Pepra, “Miliitarization,” 57. 
71 Joachim, “Draining the Swamp,” 170. 
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contend that neither approach can stand on its own, without including some aspects of the 
other. Problems that came to light were the overlapping roles of U.S. agencies 
administering aid, which contribute to poor results, and the inadequate equipment, 
platforms, and operational status of African security agencies.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis takes an explanatory approach in ascertaining the priorities of U.S.-
Nigerian relations for enhanced security in Nigeria. Various sources are used to carry out 
this research. Priority is given to primary sources in Nigeria and the United States. On the 
Nigerian side, senate hearings, government documents, and recorded interviews will be 
consulted; on the American side, congressional hearings, committee reports, 
Congressional Research Service reports, Government Accountability Office reports, and 
official declassified U.S. documents.  
Secondary sources, which include books, publications, expert analysis, journals, 
and media and class debates on U.S. policy on Africa, enrich this research. Efforts will be 
made to balance the literature between scholars from the West who have written a great 
deal on Africa and scholars of African origin. 
Newspapers and periodicals are of particular interest in the light of the current 
global outcry on the Boko Haram debacle. CNN, BBC, the Nigerian Network News, and 
the Nigerian press generally will provide useful insights. Analysis from the Nigerian 
Institute for international Affairs, United States Agency for International Development, 
and seminars held at both the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Monterey Institute of 
International Studies has been very helpful and will be cited.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis that follows contains five chapters. This chapter provides a historical 
overview of U.S.-Nigerian relations from Nigerian independence to the present day. It 
also covered the literature review and methodology used.  
 17 
Chapter II addresses Nigeria’s security challenges and the drivers of insecurity in 
Nigeria. It focuses on terrorism and maritime-security challenges that connect with U.S. 
security initiatives. This focus facilitates analysis and measurements of effectiveness.  
Chapter III deals with U.S. security initiatives in Nigeria from the perspective of 
the U.S. strategy for SSA, covering security-sector reforms, ACOTA, AFRICOM, and 
other programs that address state and humanitarian security. 
Chapter IV reconciles security challenges and corresponding initiatives to 
discover the gaps that need to be addressed. It essentially forms a basis for analysis and 
policy positions on each issue. 
Chapter V contains a conclusion and recommendations, synthesizing the research 
in the previous chapters. 
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II. ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES 
AND THEIR UNDERLYING CAUSES 
Democratization has restored Nigeria as a strategic partner in the comity of 
nations, particularly in terms of the pivotal role it has played in Africa’s security and 
stability. The United States has also increased DOD programs to build the capacity of the 
Nigerian military to combat such threats as terrorism and piracy. Nonetheless, the 
security challenges seem to increase. Issues like terrorism in northern Nigeria, militancy 
in the Niger Delta, kidnappings across the country, and piracy in local and regional 
waters have all risen—and are rising still. This chapter explores the past and present of 
Nigeria’s security challenges and their underlying causes.  
A. NIGERIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES 
Nigeria, on the one hand, is a blessed country in terms of enormous mineral and 
natural resources; on the other hand, it is tormented with turmoil within and without its 
borders.72 Although fractures along ethnic and religious lines have received perhaps the 
most and the most sustained international attention, there is much more to Nigeria’s 
security situation—and the underlying causes are complex and sometimes connected. The 
major threats to Nigeria’s security include terrorism; ethno-religious violence, and 
communal crises; militancy in the Niger Delta; piracy; and health and infectious 
diseases.73  
1. Terrorism  
Terrorism in Nigeria is mainly perpetrated by Boko Haram. The exact origin of 
Boko Haram is obscure, but its linkage with Nigeria’s fanatical Maitatsine sect of the 
early 1980s seems to resonate in most literature.74 Boko Haram translates to English as 
“Western education is forbidden,” a programmatic motto that well reflects one of the 
72 Clarence J. Bouchat, The Causes of Instability in Nigeria and Implications for the United States 
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College- Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 1‒5. 
73 IHS, “Nigeria Security”; Ploch, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” i. 
74 J Peter Pham, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat,” no. 20 (2012):1, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/
Africa-Security-Brief/ASB-20.pdf. 
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group’s aims; the group prefers to be identified by the name Jama’atu Alhus-Sunnah 
Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s 
Teachings and Jihad).75 The group is religiously motivated and espouses a pan-Islamic or 
Jihadi ideology. It wants to see the creation of an Islamic regime in northern Nigeria, free 
from Western influences.76  
The group started as a movement in 2001 at Ndimi Mosque in Borno State, 
located in the northeastern part of Nigeria. In a bid to create a community based on 
Sharia and Islamic principles, the group moved from Maiduguri to the neighboring 
Kanamma village of Yobe state in 2002. Essentially, Yobe and Maiduguri were big cities 
in Borno state before Yobe state was founded in 1991. The people of this part of Nigeria 
are mostly Muslims and share the same culture. The states are also the most 
impoverished in Nigeria in terms of resources, infrastructure, and unemployment. 
Additionally, poverty is on the increase while the literacy rate is low.77 Thus, the group’s 
more immediate grievances are the poor socioeconomic conditions and corruption in 
northern Nigeria. Thereafter, the group became more radicalized and ideological 
espousing Jihadi ideology.   
Boko Haram came to the attention of the Nigerian media in 2003, when it 
attacked police stations and government buildings in Yobe because of police intervention 
in fishing-rights disputes. The group, then referred to as the “Nigerian Taliban,” also 
ultimately attracted the attention of the media and the U.S. embassy in Nigeria. Further 
confrontation with the police in Yobe led to the death of the group’s leader, Mohammed 
Ali. The remaining members of the group fled back to Maiduguri under the leadership of 
75 Andrew Walker, “What Is Boko Haram” (Washington ,DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012), 
1‒2; Sage, “Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement,” 3‒4. 
76 Lori Hinnant and Sylvie Corbet, “Summit Combats Boko Haram Funds, Arms, Training,” 
Associated Press,http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/may/17/african-leaders-work-to-counter-boko-
haram/; Corina Simonelli, “Boko Haram Recent Attacks,” http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/
STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf. 
77 National Bureau for Statistics, “Revised and Final Results by Output Approach,” 
http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbslibrary/economic-statistics/gross-domestic-product. 
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Mohammed Yusuf, who began rapidly reorganizing the group and built a private mosque 
on land belonging to his father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed.78 
Despite its violent record, the group was left to go about its activities in 
Maiduguri unperturbed. The official latitude might have been attributed to the desire to 
allow the group freedom to practice its religion in a predominantly Muslim state or to a 
lack of effective intelligence about the group. Either way, this respite gave Boko Haram 
the opportunity to propagate its radical beliefs, recruit new members, and operate under 
Sharia law. It drew members from the impoverished villages of Maiduguri as well as the 
border communities of the Republics of Chad and Niger. The group’s source of funds is 
unclear. However, it is alleged that some Muslim northern Nigerian politicians and 
Salafist contacts in Saudi Arabia are the main sources of funding, which is supplemented 
by robbery, kidnapping, and human trafficking.79 The argument about the northern 
Nigerian politicians sponsorship plays into the narrative of supporting the Islamic cause 
to avoid being blacklisted. Some would also argue that the politicians from the ruling 
party and the opposition are using the insurgency to make claims and counterclaims for 
political gains.80   
Most Nigerian Muslims and scholars have not accepted the group’s hardline 
ideology. For example, in 2007 a highly revered Muslim cleric, Sheik Mahmoud Ja’afar, 
denounced the sect—and was brutally murdered for it. The assassination of Sheik Ja’afar 
further alienated Boko Haram from mainstream Muslim support, especially in 
northwestern Nigeria.  
Still, the group continued to escalate its rhetoric and its violence. Boko Haram’s 
major campaign began in 2009, when members on motorcycles shot some traffic 
policemen enforcing the use of helmets. The event was followed by a series of attacks on 
78 Walker, “What Is Boko Haram,” 3‒4. 
79 Simonelli, “Boko Haram,” 3; Walker, “What Is Boko Haram,” 3‒5; Ahmad Murtada, “Boko Haram 
in Nigeria: Its Beginning, Principles, and Activities,” Islamic and African Studies Journal, no. 12 (2012): 
7‒8. 




                                                 
police stations, punctuated by a video that the group disseminated in which Mohammed 
Yusuf threatened more attacks on police and government buildings.81 
In response, the government security agencies launched a full-scale operation 
against Boko Haram in 2009. Ibn Tammiyah mosque was cordoned, several people were 
killed, and some were executed without trial. The Nigerian Army arrested and handed 
over Mohammed Yusuf to the police during one of its raids, in 2009. Yusuf died in police 
custody, but the police claimed he died during a shootout. The surviving members fled, 
while others blended into the society—akin to Mao Tse-tung’s description of “insurgents 
moving in society like fish in water.”82 
The period between late 2009 and 2010 was relatively peaceful, which appeared 
to mark a victory for Nigerian security agencies. In reality, however, the sect used this 
period to reorganize and train across the Sahel and North Africa. Now under the 
leadership of Yusuf’s deputy Abubakar Shekau, the group is said to have trained with 
other extremist groups, including Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab, and the 
Tuareg rebels in Mali. Shekau organized the group into cells that have committed 
atrocities across Nigeria in the years since.  
The frequency, audacity, ferocity, and indiscriminate nature of Boko Haram’s 
attacks have cast doubts on Nigeria’s ability to counter terrorism alone. Boko Haram and 
its cohorts have resorted to kidnapping for ransom and intimidation. For example, in 
2013, Ansaru claimed responsibility for raiding a multinational construction company’s 
site and abducted seven foreign workers.83 Furthermore, in 2012 Boko Haram kidnapped 
and killed a German national, Edgar Fritz Raupach, in Kano state. Further, the abduction 
of 276 schoolgirls on April 15, 2014, has provoked international condemnation and 
response.84 For instance, the United States sent more than 80 marines to assist Nigerian 
security agencies, while France held an emergency summit with Africa leaders in Paris 
81 Murtada, “Boko Haram,” 8. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, 13. 
84 IHS, “Nigeria Security.” 
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on May 17, 2014, to coordinate efforts on combatting Boko Haram.85 Nigeria has 
received counterterrorism cooperation from neighboring countries of Chad, Niger, and 
Cameroon. Nevertheless, none of the girls have been found and terrorist incidents have 
continued. 
Statistics from the global terrorism database (Figure 2) indicate that from 2009 to 
2013, 9 percent of Boko Haram’s targets were military, while 22 percent were police. 
 
Figure 2.  Boko Haram’s Target Types 2009–2013.86 
Figure 2 also reveals that private citizens are the worst hit, representing 25 percent 
of the target. Education, which the group most loathes, is among the least affected—
7 percent. Such horrific indiscriminate targeting draws some correlation with other pan-
Islamic terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.  
 
85 Corbet, “Summit Combats Boko Haram Funds, Arms, Training”; Simonelli, “Boko Haram,” 3. 
86 Simonelli, “Boko Haram,” 3. 
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Some military and police personnel have been accused of tipping off Boko Haram 
on impending military operations.87 It has also been reported local authorities and 
citizens withhold information for the fear of their family being targeted by Boko 
Haram.88 Investigations to ascertain the veracity of these claims have been partly 
politicized and partly inconclusive.89 In a recent video, the Boko Harm leadership 
ridiculed the “bring back our girls” campaign, which suggests that the situation has not 
significantly changed.90 Boko Haram has also posted the beheading of a Nigerian Air 
Force pilot who was missing after ejecting from his aircraft.91 Consequently, the 
persistence of Boko Haram has continued to damage the prestige of the Nigerian security 
sector at national and global level.  
2. Ethno-Religious Violence and Communal Crises 
Boko Haram represents a particularly dangerous extension of Nigeria’s ethno-
religious violence and communal crisis, which continue to present great threats to 
Nigeria’s security and stability, with huge ramifications in terms of lives and property. 
Since the early 1980s, Nigeria has witnessed several ethno-religious crises. Some of these 
crises include: the Maitatsine religious disturbances in Kano,92 the Zangon Kataf crisis in 
87Pamela Dockins, “Army,  Boko Haram Working Together in Parts of Nigeria?” Voice of America, 
April 5, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/army-boko-haram-working-together-in-parts-of-nigeria/
1887128.html.  
 
88 Tansa Musa, “Living in ‘Total Fear’ of Boko Haram in Cameroon’s North,” Reuters, June 26, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/uk-cameroon-boko-haram-idUSKBN0F130B20140626. 
89 nsnbc International, “Nigerian Military: No Officers Arrested over Collusion with Boko Haram,” 
June 4, 2014, http://nsnbc.me/2014/06/04/nigerian-military-officers-arrested-collusion-boko-haram/. 
90 Colin Freeman, “Missing Nigerian Schoolgirls: Boko Haram Issues New Video Mocking Bring 
Back our Girls Campaign,” Telegraph, July 13 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/nigeria/10964606/Missing-Nigerian-schoolgirls-Boko-Haram-issues-new-video-
mocking-BringBackOurGirls-campaign.html. 
91 Stephanie Linning, “Boko Haram Releases Video Showing Beheading of Nigerian Air Force Pilot 
as Terror Leader Who Was Thought Dead Reappears,” Daily Mail, October 3, 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2780169/Boko-Haram-releases-video-showing-beheading-
Nigerian-Air-Force-pilot-terror-leader-declares-Even-kill-not-stop-imposing-Islamic-rule.html. 
92 Maintastine crisis was the first Islamic cult violence in Nigeria. It occurred in 1984 in Kano and 
some parts of Maiduguri— the current stronghold of Boko Haram. The group shares the same name of its 
leader Marwa Maitatsine, who claimed to be a prophet. The group carried out major atrocities and 
execution of non-members until the decapitation of its leader by the Nigerian Army. 
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Kaduna State,93 the Ife-modakeke crisis in Oyo State,94 and the most current ethno-
religious violence in Jos, Plateau State.95 The Ife-Modakeke crisis was purely ethnic; the 
other conflicts have religious dimensions to them.96 
Most of the ethno-religious conflicts have triggered retaliation against religious or 
ethnic minorities in other parts of Nigeria. For example, the Shagumu crises between the 
Yorubas and the Hausas provoked the expulsion of Yorubas and the destruction of their 
property in Kano. As the situation began to ease, the Odua People’s Congress, a pan-
Yoruba organization, carried out reprisal attacks on Hausa/Fulani traders in the Lagos 
Mile-12 market. Similarly, the introduction of Sharia law in Zamfara State and its 
spillover effect in other parts of northern Nigeria led to the destruction of properties 
belonging to the Igbos in Kaduna State. In the same vein, the Igbos in Enugu State took 
on the Hausa community by killing people and destroying their property.97 The map in 
Figure 3 shows the Sharia-compliant states in Nigeria.  
93The 1992 Zangon Kataf crisis started with the killing of some Muslims in the Zangon Kataf local 
government area of Kaduna state. It resulted in what Richard English referred to as a vicious cycle of 
victimhood that polarized a hitherto peaceful city. Since then, little misunderstandings have escalated to 
religious conflicts, and some neighborhoods are now predominately Christian, while others are Muslim.  
94 The Ife-Modakeke crisis was a violent communal clash between Ife and Modakeke communities in 
Oyo state located in southwestern Nigeria. Although land disputes have existed for decades, the violence 
from 1998 to 2004 resulted in the death of thousands of people. 
95 The ethno-religious violence in Jos started in September 2001 when a Christian was appointed 
chairman of a local government. The protest led to the deaths of more than 160 people and from then on 
there had been violent killings almost akin to genocide in some cases. The complexity of the crisis 
overwhelmed the police, and Joint Task Force was established to intervene between the warring 
communities. According to Human Rights Watch, 4,000‒7,000 people have been killed due to ethno-
religious violence in Jos since 2001.  
96 B. Salawu, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New 
Mangement Strategies,” European Journal of Social Science 13, no. 3 (2010) 345–47; Olufunmilayo E. 
Thontteh, Oluseyi O. Fabiyi, and Paul Borisade, “Spatial and Social Dimensions of Post Conflict Urban 
Reconstruction Programme in South Western Nigeria. The Case of Ile-Ife, Nigeria,” Journal of Settlements 
and Spatial Planning 3, no. 2 (2012):165‒67. 
97 Salawu, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria,” 346. 
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Figure 3.  Map of Nigeria Showing the Sharia-Compliant States.98 
The map also reveals that all the Sharia-compliant states are in northern Nigeria 
above the Niger and Benue Rivers and violent attacks are more common especially in the 
northeast—Boko Haram’s stronghold. 
Notably, most of the sectarian violence has occurred with impunity, and now it is 
a well-tried tactic because of the government’s failure to address the root causes. 
According to the U.S Commission for International and Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 
“As many as 14,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1990 in sectarian violence …. 
[The] Nigerian government has tolerated the violence, creating a culture of violence that 
emboldened Boko Haram and its sympathizers.”99 
98 Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, “Introduction and Overview,” in Boko Haram: Islamism, 
Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, ed. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (Ipskamp Drukkers, 
Enschede, Netherlands: African Studies Centre, 2014), v. 
99 Ploch, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” 11. 
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3. Militancy and Oil Theft in the Niger Delta 
Militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria remains a major national security 
threat despite the federal government of Nigeria’s amnesty agreement in 2009. The major 
militant groups that existed before the amnesty were the Niger Delta People Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), and the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Even after the amnesty agreement, the 
erstwhile militants still see themselves as the defenders of the Niger Delta people who 
have suffered neglect for decades in spite of the region’s huge oil resources. Indeed, the 
oil industry has inspired some of the militancy and violence among the groups, angry 
over environmental degradation from oil spillage and gas flaring that is connected to the 
destruction of fishery habitat and agricultural land—the main means of livelihood for the 
locals.  
The militants capitalized on these environmental problems and hazards to 
perpetrate all sorts of crimes in the name of righting wrongs, and these actions have had 
significant effects on Nigeria’s oil production capacity. The crimes include damaging and 
destroying the oil pipelines, stealing oil, and kidnapping of foreign oil workers for 
ransom. Kidnapping is aimed at the foreign employees of multinational companies, who 
covertly or overtly pay huge ransoms to the Niger Delta militants. For instance, on May 
4, 2014, three Dutch workers were kidnapped in Delta state.100 Nigeria now ranks third, 
after Mexico and India, among the top 20 countries in the world with the highest 
kidnapping rate.101 
In a move to stop this criminality, the government granted amnesty to all the 
militants. The amnesty agreement required the militants to hand over arms, ammunition, 
and equipment to the government and to give up criminal acts. For its part, the 
government promised reforms and other immediate benefits to the militants. The central 
government also inaugurated rehabilitation and reintegration programs for the ex-
100 IHS, “Nigeria Security,” 6. 
101 Steven Perlberg,“The 20 Countries Where People Get Kidnapped the Most,” Business Insider, 
December 12, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/top-20-countries-by-kidnapping-2013-
12#ixzz38EQ793LH. 
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militants. It is estimated that Nigeria spends more than $400 million every year for the 
amnesty program.  
Despite these huge sums of money spent on the post-amnesty program, militancy 
and criminality, especially oil theft and kidnappings, continue in the Niger Delta. Most of 
the criminality is blamed on disaffected militants who either are dissatisfied with the 
amnesty package or perhaps prefer to make easy money from oil theft instead of 
reintegrating into society. The ramifications of their activities are the further degradation 
of the environment from destroyed oil pipelines and the high loss of revenue to the 
country. Nigeria loses about N400 million (US $2 million) daily because of illegal oil 
activities.  
4. Piracy  
Piracy is a major security concern for Nigeria in particular and the Gulf of Guinea 
(GOG) in general. Most of Nigeria’s deep-water oil platforms are in the GOG, and the 
GOG and Nigerian territorial waters house many multinational oil companies from the 
United States, Europe, and Asia. Additionally, more than 90 percent of Nigeria’s 
international trade transits the GOG. At the same time, the GOG is plagued with a high 
incidence of piracy, criminality, sea robbery, and kidnapping. As a result, the 
international maritime organization ranked Nigeria No. 1 in global pirate attacks before 
the Somali pirates came on stage in 2008. Unfortunately, Nigeria is gradually reclaiming 
this dubious distinction with increasing attacks and criminality in the Nigerian waters and 
the GOG by Nigerian militants. The international maritime bureau’s (IMBs) data on the 
seven countries with the highest rate of pirate attacks in 2013 (Figure 4) reveals that 
Nigeria recorded 31 attacks, making it second only to Indonesia, which had 106 attacks.  
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Figure 4.  Seven Countries with the Highest Number of Pirate Attacks in 
2013.102 
Interestingly, Somalia witnessed only seven such piracy incidents in the same 
period, which may be a result of the activities of the Combined Joined Task Force-Horn 
of Africa (CJTF-HOA).103  
The IMB’s 2013 report on piracy and armed robbery against ships, summarized in 
Table 1, shows that piracy was declining in and around Nigeria—down to ten incidents in 
2011. 
102 IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships” (London: IMB, 2013), 5. 
103 Ibid. 
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Table 1.   Location of Actual and Attempted Attacks, 2009–2013.104 
 
 
However, there was a sharp increase in piracy incidents in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively. This trend holds for the GOG region. Furthermore, as of April 2014, Nigeria 
has recorded more than 12 attacks. Prominent among these attacks were the attack of MT 
Kerela of Angola on January 18, 2014, and the attack on SP Brussel on April 29, 2014. 
The pirates stole about 12,270 metric tons of diesel fuel from MT Kerela before releasing 
the vessel. In the case of SP Brussels, the chief engineer and two pirates were killed. 
The audacity of the pirates suggests that they operated as part of a well-
coordinated criminal network with intelligence on the products the target vessels were 
carrying. It is also alleged that Niger Delta militants or the post-amnesty splinter groups 
prefer the lucrative returns of piracy rather than taking part in the amnesty programs. 
Also, pirates act with some impunity, stemming from the size of the area relative to the 
Nigerian Navy’s capacity to patrol, which makes it easy for such criminality to thrive. 
104 Ibid., 6. 
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5. Health and Infectious Disease Threats 
Health and infectious disease threats are increasingly becoming serious security 
threats in Nigeria and the SSA. These threats have global ramifications because of the 
easy movement of people across the continents. Some of the prominent diseases include 
malaria, tuberculosis, hepatitis, cholera, typhoid, HIV/AIDS, and most recently Ebola 
virus disease (EVD), formerly known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever. Table 2 shows the 
fatal diseases and the corresponding deaths from 2007 to 2011. 




The data also reveals a general decrease in death rates from 2007 to 2011. For, 
example malaria-related deaths decreased drastically from 10, 506 deaths to 3,222 deaths 
while HIV/AIDS decreased from 740 deaths to 467 deaths. The absence of EVD in the 
data shows that it was not a health threat in Nigeria before 2014. Nevertheless, this 
section will focus on HIV/AIDS and the EVD. 
105 Yemi Kale, NBS Social Statistics on Nigeria 2012-Part III: Health, Employment, Public Safety, 
Population, and Vital Registration (Nigeria: National Bureau for Statistics, 2013), 15. 
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HIV/AIDS as a security challenge comes from the development of a human 
security paradigm as part of the security agenda of most countries.106 In Africa, Sandra 
Joireman reckons that “it is the pervasiveness of the disease and the lack of treatment that 
multiplies its effect to the point that it becomes a security issue for states.”107 For 
example, former South African President Thabo Mbeki contended that HIV was a 
Western conspiracy and did not place HIV/AIDS issues as a priority, while many other 
countries lack the resources to treat or prevent the pandemic.108  
The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria is about 3.5 percent.109 As of 2013, the 
estimated deaths from AIDS were about 220,100. More than 414,000 people are 
receiving anti-retroviral treatment, while about 34,000 women are receiving treatment for 
the prevention of mother-to-child transmission.110 The figure is better than in South 
Africa, with a prevalence infection rate of 10 percent to 25 percent.111 Still, a further look 
at the statistics reveals that the people affected are overwhelmingly adults. Considering 
that 40 percent of the current Nigerian population is under 15 years of age, morbidity and 
mortality among the adults for HIV/AIDS will create a huge vacuum in various sectors of 
the economy. Research also reveals that HIV/AIDS is more prevalent among the security 
forces than the civilians.112 Thus, an infected security force will be able to contribute to 
neither national nor regional security imperatives. 
EVD has become a major security threat, not only to Africa but also to the entire 
world. The infection and death rates of the March 2014 EVD outbreak in Liberia, Guinea, 
106 Jacqui Ala, “Aids as a New Security Threat,” in From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving 
Security Challenges (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 131. 
107 Sandra F. Joireman, “HIV/AIDS in Africa and Us National Security,” UCLA International 
Institute, April 30, 2004, http://www1.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=107610. 
108 New York Times, “Thabo Mbeki and AIDS,” New York Times, Novemeber 4, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/04/opinion/thabo-mbeki-and-aids.html. 
109 UNICEF, “At a Glance: Nigeria,” Deember 27, 2013, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
nigeria_statistics.html.  
110 PEPFAR, “Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Nigeria,” accessed August 7, 2014, 
http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/199599.pdf. 
111 Ploch, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” 17. 




                                                 
and Sierra Leone have shocked the world. It simply takes one infected person to travel to 
another country undetected and potentially spread the disease, as was the case of the 
Liberians who traveled to Nigeria and the United States.113 Table 3 shows the total case 
count, total deaths, and the laboratory confirmed cases of EVD by country. 
Table 3.   EVD Statistics by Country March–September 2014.114  




Guinea 1022 635 832 
Liberia 3820 1677 890 
Nigeria 20 8 19 
Senegal 1940 597 1745 
Sierra Leone 1 0 1 
Total 6263 2917 3487 
 
The data shows that as of September 25, 2014, there has been a total case count of 
6,263 persons, total deaths of 2,917 persons, and total of 3,487 laboratory-confirmed 
cases. Nigeria has a total case count of 20 persons, total deaths of 8 persons, and total 
laboratory-confirmed cases of 19 persons. Only one case has been confirmed in Senegal 
113 CBS News, “Ebola Outbreak’s Long, Winding Path to U.S. Shores,” CBS News, October 5, 2014, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-outbreaks-long-winding-path-to-us-shores/; USA TODAY, “Nigeria 
Death Shows Ebola Can Spread by Air Travel,” July 26, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/
2014/07/26/nigeria-death-shows-ebola-can-spread-by-air-travel/13215429/. 
114 Center for Disease Control, “2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa,” CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/outbreaks/guinea/. 
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with no deaths. The high death figure in Liberia, Guinea, and Senegal casts doubt on the 
healthcare system and capacity of the medical personnel to handle the epidemic.115 
At least four Americans have been evacuated from Africa due to EVD 
infection.116 Additionally, the U.S. government has pledged to provide assistance to 
mitigate the menace of the epidemic. In a special session during the UN conference of 
September 2014, President Obama stressed the need for African leaders to upgrade their 
healthcare systems because the United States’ assistance alone will not solve the 
problem.117 Furthermore, Nigeria was commended for its swift action in containing 
Ebola, as no new cases have been reported since August 31, 2014.118 Unlike the other 
affected countries, Nigeria was able to utilize the support provided by the U.S. Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) at federal and state levels because of its existing capacity on the 
ground.119 This point underscores the need for building and sustaining on-ground-
capacity to meet different healthcare contingencies in Africa. 
B. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSECURITY IN NIGERIA 
Generally, the drivers of insecurity in a country can be categorized as either 
internal or external. Achumba et al. argue that internal sources are the key drivers of 
insecurity in Nigeria.120 The internal root causes that ramify most in Nigeria include 
weak institutions, illiteracy, poverty, and porous borders.121  
115 Ibid. 
116 CIDRAP, “Very Few Aircraft Equipped to Evacuate Ebola Patients,” Center for Infectious Disease 
Research and Policy, September 16, 2014, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/09/very-
few-aircraft-equipped-evacuate-ebola-patients. 
117 Voice of America, “Obama: Ebola Threat to ‘Regional, Global Security’,” VOA, September 25, 
2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-address-un-ebola-meeting/2462000.html. 
118James S. Brady, “Press Briefing on Government Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa, 
October 3, 2014,” White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/03/press-briefing-
government-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa-1032014.  
119Ibid. 
120 I.C Achumba, “Security Challenges in Nigeria,” 80. 
121 Ibid., 81‒83. 
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1. Weak Government Institutions 
Weak government institutions have fueled insecurity tremendously in Nigeria. 
The weak institutions include weak regulatory agencies, ineffective judicial-legal 
institutions, weak public service, and weak political institutions. The government 
interferes with the activities of most of the regulatory institutions. For example, the 
governor of Nigerian Central Bank was forced to resign after his request for the executive 
to account for a missing $20 billion dollars.122  
The decay and lack of such basic infrastructure as power, water, and good roads 
reflect the weakness of the public service in Nigeria. Political institutions responsible for 
oversight have often been found to prefer corruption over accountability—for themselves 
as well as the areas of the public sector that they oversee. For instance, a House of 
Representatives committee on power was alleged to have received an N100-million bribe 
to distort the report.123 
In terms of legal institutions, Joachim contends, “The rise of sharia in Nigeria is a 
powerful illustration of a civil society forced to find alternatives to a state that has broken 
its social contract to protect its citizens.”124 Islamic clerics capitalize on weakness in law 
enforcement and civil disorder, using militias for protection and the legitimization of 
sharia law.125 These militias sometimes take the law into their hands and their ranks are 
potential recruits for terrorists group like Boko Haram.126  
2. Illiteracy 
Illiteracy is predominant in northern Nigeria, which has now become a cauldron 
of violent extremism and terrorism as exemplified by the Boko Haram. A literacy survey 
122 Robert Looney, “The Boko Haram Economy,” Foriegn Policy, July 15, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/15/the_boko_haram_economy. 
123 Samson Adesote and John Ojo Abimbola, “Corruption and National Development in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic: A Historical Discourse,” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 14, no. 7 (2012): 
88. 
124 Joachim, “Draining the Swamp,” 161. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid., 161. 
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conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria and released in 2010 estimates 
the adult literacy rate at 56.9 percent, with huge variations between states (Lagos at 92.0 
percent versus Borno, with only 14.5 percent), regions (urban, 74.6 percent; rural 48.7 
percent), and gender (male 65.1 percent; female 48.6 percent).127 The dismal literacy 
level in Borno state speaks volumes about why Boko Haram chose the state to begin its 
operations in the first place. Data from UNESCO’s Institute of Statistics (Figure 5) reveal 
that youth ranging from 15 to 24 in age constitute much of the illiterate population in 
Nigeria. 
 
Figure 5.  Illiterate Population in Nigeria.128 
The data reveal that in 2008, a total of some 6.1 million young females and 3.6 
million young males in Nigeria counted as illiterate. In terms of percentage, Figure 5 
shows that that there is a troubling downward trend in literacy from 1990 to 2010. For 
example, the literacy rate of young males decreased from about 80 percent in 1990 to 
about 75 percent in 2010.  
127 UNESCO, Action Plan for Nigeria (Paris, France: UNESCO, 2012), 1. 
128 UNESCO, Adult and Youth Literacy 1990‒2015: Analysis of Data for 41 Selected Countries 
(Montreal, Canada: UNESCO-UIS, 2012). 
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A variety of political, cultural, and economic factors accounts for the decline in 
the literacy rate in Nigeria.129 Politically, poor wages for teachers and poor infrastructure 
may be responsible for the decline in literacy rate. Culturally, most Muslims in northern 
Nigeria combine the Islamic (Koranic) education with formal education but more 
fundamentalist Muslims, especially in remote areas, lay more emphasis on Islamic 
education.130 Economically, the downtrend in literacy may be a direct consequence of 
poverty and the inability of some Nigerians to even take advantage of such government 
initiatives as universal basic education and other mass literacy initiatives.131  
UNESCO further made a comparison between the literacy rate among the 
population under 24 years of age and the population above 65 years (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  Literacy Rate in Nigeria.132 
The data supports the argument of most scholars that illiteracy keeps many people 
from comprehending and acquiring the necessary skills for employment and by extension 
129 Victor E. Dike, “Tackling Nigeria’s Dwindling Literacy Rate,” Nigerian Village Square, March 2, 
2009, http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/victor-dike/tackling-nigerias-dwindling-literacy-
rate.html. 
130 UNESCO, “Action Plan for Nigeria,” 3. 
131 Ibid., 4; Dike, “Dwindling Literacy Rate.” 
132 UNESCO, Adult and Youth Literacy 1990‒2015, 59. 
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solving their socio-economic problems. In Nigeria, illiteracy and idleness have made the 
youth potential targets for all sorts of criminality and extremism.  
3. Poverty and Unemployment 
Poverty is another catalyst for insecurity in Nigeria. Despite enormous resources 
and wealth, most Nigerians still live in abject poverty. For example, World Bank data 
show that about 46 percent of the total population lives below the poverty line. As of 
2010, about 50.2 percent of Nigerians live on less than $2 dollars a day. Notably, 
Nigeria’s monthly living wage or minimum wage was about N7,500 naira (about 
US$1.60 a day) until 2011.133 That year, the Nigerian senate passed a bill increasing the 
minimum wage to N18,000 monthly (US$109 monthly or $3.64 a day).134 However, 
most states, especially in impoverished northern Nigerian have not been able to comply 
with the provisions of the bill. 
The data from the National Bureau for Statistics in Nigeria (Figure 7) shows that 
unemployment has increased from less than 10 million people in 2006 to about 17 million 
in 2011. 




                                                 
 
Figure 7.  Unemployed Population in Nigeria.135 
Unemployment is closely related to poverty, as most of the poor people are either 
unemployed or underemployed. What is most worrisome is that most of those affected 
are the young. For instance, according to the National Bureau for Statistics, Nigeria 
(Figure 8), the percentage of unemployed persons based on age distribution is more than 
35 percent of Nigerians aged 15–25 years and about 22 percent for those aged 25–44 
years.  
135 UNESCO, “Action Plan for Nigeria”; National Bureau for Statistics, “Revised and Final Results by 
Output Approach,” http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbslibrary/economic-statistics/gross-domestic-product. 
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Figure 8.  Unemployed Population in Nigeria.136 
The implication of these statistics is that the segment of Nigerian society that 
should be most vibrant and active is unemployed.  
With the unemployment rate coupled with the high poverty rate, extremist groups 
brainwash the youth and entice them with promises of a better life than the government 
can provide. Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria used this strategy for recruitment. 
Additionally, most of the militants in the Niger Delta were unemployed or had menial 
jobs before joining the groups. 
4. Porous Borders 
The length and porosity of the international land borders between Nigeria and the 
Republics of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Mali is also responsible for a range of crimes 
and insecurity of Nigeria. These borders have been continuously used for the trafficking 
of arms, humans, and drugs, which has connections to such major security challenges as 
piracy and terrorism. Most literature seems to agree that the main source of revenue for 
Boko Haram is drug trafficking through Nigeria’s porous borders. The terrorists also use 
the ungoverned border areas as sanctuaries. As W. O. Alli aptly notes, “In Nigeria’s 
136 National Bureau for Statistics, “Revised and Final Results by Output Approach.” 
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northern borders with Niger and Chad, armed bandits enter Nigeria at will to terrorize 
innocent citizens in towns and villages on the Nigerian side of the border.”137  
Similarly, the porosity of the northeastern borders has made Nigeria’s 
counterterrorism efforts quite difficult. Furthermore, small arms and light weapons stolen 
from the crises in Libya have found their way into Nigeria through the ungoverned large 
border areas in the north.138  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The demographics and current trends of Nigeria’s security challenges coupled 
with its underlying causes are not encouraging. The analyses reveal that terrorism is the 
most daunting security challenge in Nigeria today. The lethality and audacity of Boko 
Haram attacks have continued to damage the prestige of the Nigerian security agencies. 
Notably, the U.S. government designation of Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist 
organization on November 13, 2013, speaks volumes on the atrocities of the group. 
Additionally, the United States assistance and France President’s African security 
conference in Paris have bolstered the regional agreement between countries bordering 
northern Nigeria, such as Chad, the Niger Republic, Cameroon, and Mali, to combat 
Boko Haram. 
The continuation of the Niger Delta militancy on a lesser scale questions the 
efficacy of the ongoing amnesty program. The splinter groups of the erstwhile militant 
groups have been responsible for crimes like attacks on oil facilities, oil pipeline 
vandalism, and oil theft. Piracy and sea robbery have also increased with Nigeria ranking 
second behind Indonesia in 2013 according to the IMB reports on piracy and attacks on 
ships. Health and infectious disease threats especially the recent EVD outbreak have 
exposed the weakness of the healthcare system of most African countries. Nonetheless, 
the low EVD death figures and confirmed cases in Nigeria do not necessarily mean an 
effective healthcare system and capacity.  
137 W. O Alli, Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy (Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
2012), 60.  
138 Ibid. 
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The chapter also finds that the security challenges will continue to increase if the 
underlying causes, which are mostly humanitarian in nature, are not addressed. For 
instance, illiteracy, poverty, and unemployment predominant among the youth have 
increased their vulnerability to terrorists and criminal activities. Therefore, U.S. security 
initiatives and programs coupled with Nigerian government efforts must be re-examined 




III. ASSESSMENT OF U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA 
An assessment of U.S. security initiatives in Nigeria will help ascertain the gaps 
or disconnects that hinder progress. U.S. foreign policy has global, regional, and national 
paradigms. Under each paradigm, multiple programs are primarily run by the DOS and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The DOD has its own 
dedicated programs but also drives some DOS/USAID programs. In some cases, the 
programs overlap and prevent smooth execution.   
In Africa, the Bureau of African Affairs ensures issues are addressed and U.S. 
foreign policy objectives are met. Additionally, the U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
promulgated in June 2012, reflects the U.S. government’s commitment to developing a 
partnership based on mutual commitment and respect.139 Nonetheless, U.S. national 
security imperatives and priorities determine its level of commitment at any given time. 
For instance, inconsistency in U.S. strategy, such as the intervention in Libya against 
inaction in Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), supports this narrative.140 Notably, all U.S. 
security initiatives in Nigeria fit within the subsets of the overall U.S. strategy toward 
SSA. 
A. U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
U.S. strategy toward SSA has four distinct pillars.141 The first pillar is to 
strengthen democratic institutions; the second is to promote economic growth, trade, and 
investment; the third is to advance peace and security, including countering terrorism, 
security cooperation and security sector reforms, and mitigating mass atrocities, among 
other things; and the fourth is to promote opportunity and development.142 In order to 
139 U.S. Government, United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. The White House 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 26. 
140 Barry Neiid, “Oil vs. Cocoa: Why Ivory Coast Isn’t Like Libya,” CNN, April 5, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/04/ivory.coast.libya/index.html. 
 
142 U.S. Government, United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, 2. 
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execute these objectives, the United States initiated several hard- and soft-power security 
initiatives, which will be addressed in the following sections.  
B. HARD-POWER PROGRAMS 
The hard-power programs include USAFRICOM’s programs, Africa Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 
Program, counterterrorism programs, and maritime security programs. The overarching 
objective of these programs is to strengthen the military capability and professionalism of 
partner nations in order to enhance national, regional, and global peace.143 Nonetheless, 
most of the programs do not have standard metrics by which to measure effectiveness. In 
addition, the gap between training and implementation, the dilemma between human 
rights abuses and assistance level, and incapacity of partner nations affect the 
outcomes.144  
1. USAFRICOM 
USAFRICOM was first established as a sub-unified command under the 
European Command (EUCOM) on October 1, 2007. It became an independent unified 
command with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, on October 1, 2008.145 African 
leaders’ suspicion of U.S. intentions, resistance, and project cost at inception were 
important factors in keeping AFRICOM’s headquarters outside the continent.146 Six 
years after establishment of AFRICOM, the issues regarding its permanent location still 
resonate among U.S. politicians and military leaders. For instance, some politicians want 
AFRICOM to be located in the United States because it will save the U.S. government 
143 Curf Tarnoff, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, (CRS Report No. 
R40213) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 3‒4. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R40213.pdf 
144 GAO, “Actions Needed,” 3. 
145 Lauren Ploch, Africa Command: US Strategic Interest and Role of the U.S. Military,(CRS Report 
No.RL34003) (Washington, DC:Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL34003.pdf 
146 Lamb, “Parading U.S Security Interests as African Security Policy,” 51. 
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about $70 million yearly and create about 4,300 jobs.147 Military leaders, on the other 
hand, contend that the proximity to the African continent and complementarity of 
EUCOM make Stuttgart operationally more effective.148 Nevertheless, GAO 
recommends that DOD needs to conduct a more comprehensive cost benefit analysis on 
the permanent location of AFRICOM.149  
According to the DOD, “AFRICOM’s mission is to promote U.S. strategic 
objectives and protect U.S. interests in the region by working with African partners to 
strengthen their defense capabilities so that they are better able to contribute to regional 
stability and security.”150 AFRICOM’s five subordinate commands facilitate the 
attainment of its mission. These commands are the U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Naval Forces 
Africa , U.S. Air Forces Africa, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa , CJTF-HOA, and U.S. 
Special Operations Command Africa .151 AFRICOM covers a wide range of 
contingencies to help partner countries gain the necessary skills in combatting Africa’s 
security challenges. However, most programs are not country-specific and scenarios may 
not be tailored to solve a particular country’s challenges. Thus, in the final analysis the 
intended outcomes would either not be achieved or take a longer time to be achieved. 
Additionally, it may be more costly if the problems become more complex like the case 
of terrorism and maritime crimes in Nigeria.   
AFRICOM uses security cooperation, exercises, and operations in support of its 
mission and U.S. foreign policy.152  
147 John Pendleton, DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent Location of U.S. Africa Command 
(GAO-13-646) (Washington, D C: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 10. 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-646 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., 20. 
150 Ploch, Africa Command, ii. 
151 U.S. Africa Command, “What We Do,” AFRICOM, http://www.africom.mil. 
152 Ibid. 
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a. Security Cooperation Programs 
Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) include ACOTA programs, the 
TSCTP, and the APS. APS is a maritime security cooperation program. AFRICOM and 
NAVAF carry out various maritime-security trainings using mobile training teams on the 
APS (a designated U.S. Navy ship). Additionally, personnel from African navies join the 
APS for three to six months for on-the-job training.153 The training is to develop capacity 
of the participants in counter-piracy and maritime interdiction operations against crimes 
such as drug trafficking and human trafficking.  
b. Exercises  
AFRICOM exercises are designed to train African partners on specific priority 
capacity-building areas. For example, Exercise FLINTLOCK is focused on training 
TSCTP nations in special forces operations for protecting civilians and denying terrorists 
safe haven; Exercise ENDEAVOR is designed to improve communication procedures/
interoperability, and Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS involves counter-piracy and 
counter-narcotics in the West African maritime domain.154 These exercises are hosted by 
a designated partner nation. For instance, the Nigerian Navy hosted Exercise 
OBANGAME EXPRESS 2014.155 The exercise took place April 16–23, 2014, and 
involved 11 nations on 36 different vessels. During the exercise, 47 boarding drills were 
carried out.  
The exercise was adjudged to be successful by observers from the United States 
and partner countries. For instance, at the closing ceremony, the Nigerian Chief of the 
Naval Staff Vice Admiral Usman O. Jibrin noted that “I have observed the actions and 
proceeding of the exercise and I am happy with the outcome.” His comment supports the 
efficacy of U.S. security programs.156 However, the United States has no strategy to 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155“Obangame Express,” USAFRICOM, http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/obangame-
express.  
156 Westton Jones, “Obangame Express 2014 Concludes,” U.S Navy, April 23, 2014, 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=80539. 
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monitor implementation after the training, which may explain the increase in maritime 
crime after the exercise.157 Consequently, the U.S. government requires a comprehensive 
implementation strategy for its security programs.  
c. Operations 
Operations involve African partners and other international allies. For instance, 
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, which was an air campaign over Libya, involved NATO 
countries. Although NATO mostly drove Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, conspiracy 
theorists believed it was a U.S. operation. However, such operations improve 
interoperability and capacity of African forces when operating in a multinational 
environment. Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS focused on training partners against 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, while Operation ONWARD LIBERTY 
was a mentoring operation designed to transform the Liberian military.158 In the case of 
Uganda, U.S. national security priorities against violent extremism and the LRA 
downplayed full sanctions despite obvious human rights abuses.159 For example, the 
Ugandan government’s passing of anti-gay law did not attract full sanctions from the 
United States.160 If U.S. assistance to the Ugandan Army stops, the United States’ 
GWOT against the Somali terrorists, Al Shabaab, would be affected. Such a selective 
approach questions the U.S. threshold for human rights abuses, especially in the case of 
Nigeria.  
2. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)  
In 2002, ACOTA replaced the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, which was 
established in 1997 to build the capacity of African countries in humanitarian and peace 
157 Pendleton, Actions Needed, 20. 
158 U.S. Africa Command, “What We Do.” 
159 Grant Harris and Stephen Pomper, “Further U.S. Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Uganda,” 
White House, June 19, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/06/19/further-us-efforts-protect-
human-rights-uganda.  
160 Ibid.  
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support operations.161 ACOTA is a DOS program within the regional office of the 
Bureau of African Affairs, but AFRICOM provides it with mentors and advisers.162 
When the Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI) was founded in 2004, ACOTA 
became one of its main instruments.163 GPOI was a U.S. response to the G-8 action plan 
to build global capacity for UN peacekeeping operations.164 
One of the objectives of ACOTA is to bolster regional peace, humanitarian, and 
disaster relief capabilities on the African continent. These capabilities are expected to 
prepare African nations more effectively to take responsibility for crises or humanitarian 
problems, thereby achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. Thus, ACOTA focuses on 
enhancing the cooperation of partner nations through multinational training programs and 
common doctrine.   
ACOTA has 25 partner countries, including Nigeria, that have benefited from 
non-lethal equipment and training. It is estimated that some 254,228 military personnel in 
257 contingents have received training. As part of the ACOTA’s objective of building the 
partner country’s capacity for peace support operations training, Nigeria has established a 
peacekeeping center in Jaji Military Cantonment, Kaduna. Table 4 shows the number of 
peacekeepers trained in select partner African countries. 
161 U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, “Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA),” 5, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Vol%2030_4/
U.S.%20Africa%20Command%20Public%20Affairs.pdf. 
162 Ibid., 6. 




                                                 
Table 4.   Peacekeepers and Peacekeeper Trainers Trained, 2005‒2009.165  
 
 
Table 4 shows that as of 2009, Nigeria was the foremost beneficiary of ACOTA, 
with 9,463 peacekeepers trained and 586 peacekeeper trainers trained. Apart from the 
recent engagement of the Nigerian security agencies in the fight against Boko Haram, 
Nigerian contingents have continued to play a pivotal role in sub-regional and regional 
peacekeeping efforts. Nevertheless, the skills gained from ACOTA training may not 
necessarily translate to the skills required to combat terrorism.  
3. Counterterrorism Programs and Training 
U.S. counterterrorism (CT) programs and training cover a wide spectrum of 
activities against the backdrop of the GWOT and the metastasizing nature of the current 
wave of terror. The CT programs include the TSCTP, Operation Enduring Freedom 
Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), and Counter Violence 
Extremism (CVE).166The TSCTP was established in 2005 to build the capacity of 
African partners in counterterrorism. It was originally designed for the Sahel region 
165 Nina M. Serafino, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress 
(CRS Report No. RL32773) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 18. http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL32773.pdf 
166 U.S. Department of State, “Programs and Initiatives,” DOS, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/. 
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(Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger) under the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), 
but later extended to Nigeria, Senegal, and Cameroon.167  
The objective of the TSCTP is to develop partner nations’ capacity to counter 
violent extremism, improve border and customs operations, and bolster financial 
intelligence.168 TSCTP is a multi-agency program executed by the DOS, USAID, and the 
DOD.169 Figure 9 shows the analysis of the GAO on the respective activities of the three 
core agencies. 
 
Figure 9.  TSCTP Activities versus the Agencies.170 
The figure shows that public diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and the support 
for vulnerable populations overlap between the agencies. Also the issues of interagency 
coordination resulting in different TSCTP missions have been identified as a major 
impediment to the effectiveness of the TSCTP.171 Unless such multiple bureaucracies are 
167 Ibid. 
168 Lesley Warner, “Nine Questions About the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership You Were 
Too Embarrassed to Ask,” War on the Rocks, April8, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/nine-
questions-about-the-trans-sahara-counter-terrorism-partnership-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/#_. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Pendleton, Actions Needed, 14. 
171 Ibid., 4. 
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reduced or eliminated, the U.S. security initiatives will not achieve their intended 
outcomes.    
TSCTP is funded from the peacekeeping operations funds, the economic support 
fund, and the non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs funds. In 
2007, 74 percent of the TSCTP obligated fund went to the Sahel region, 8 percent to 
Nigeria and Senegal, and 3 percent to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.172 TSCTP 
obligated funds according to country and region are depicted in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.  TSCTP Obligated Funds Allocated to Countries and Regions, 
2009‒2013.173 
Figure 10 shows that even as of 2013 Nigeria has received only US$12.8 million 
despite the designation of Boko Haram as an FTO due to its increased lethality. Human 
rights abuses have been one of the main reasons stalling counterterrorism assistance to 
172 GlobalSeccurity.org, “Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),” GlobalSecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm. 
173 Pendleton, Combating Terrorism, i. 
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Nigeria.174 It is therefore important for the U.S. government to work with Nigeria toward 
improving respect for human rights rather than letting problems escalate.  
The Sahel countries not only received more than US$30 million but also got 
US$81.8 million for the regional TSCTP. Figure 11 gives a breakdown of country-level 
funding from 2005 to 2007. 
 
Figure 11.  Distribution of Funds for USAID and DOS TSCTP Activities, 2005–
2007.175 
The statistics in Figure 11 reveal a significant fluctuation in funding especially in 
Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco. The 2005 coup in Mauritania was responsible for the 
reduced funding in 2006, but in Mali, reduced funding in 2006 was not fully justified, and 
it resulted in the suspension of the USAID peace-building project.176 Nigeria only 
became a beneficiary of the TSCTP in 2007. Additionally, the regional program had no 
funding in 2006.  
174 House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International 
Organizations, Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond, July 10, 2014, 1, 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-human-rights-vetting-nigeria-and-beyond 
175 Pendleton, Actions Needed, 25.  
176 Ibid. 
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Regional programs also include participants from other countries. For instance, 
Nigeria has participated in TSCTP regional programs on medical, logistics, 
communications, and intelligence training against terrorism.177 At the country level, 
TSCTP has conducted civil-military relations training, counter-improvised explosive 
devices (IED) training, and border security and crisis management training in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness is doubtful partly because TSCTP does not have standard 
metrics to measure outcomes.178   
The ATA covers a wide spectrum of activities and training, which include 
developing core capabilities in developing a legal framework to ensure that security 
agencies of partner nations act according to international best practices and rule of 
law.179 For example, the customs mutual assistance agreement is a legal framework that 
allows for the exchange of information and guides partner nations on the prosecution of 
customs offenses including those related to terrorism. In Nigeria, ATA has developed the 
capacity of security agencies to prevent, detect, and investigate terrorist threats. It has 
also bolstered capacity for enhancing border security and managing responses.180 The 
beneficiary agencies for the ATA are the National Emergency Management Agency 
(NEMA), Nigeria Customs Service, and the Nigeria Police Force. One major area in 
which ATA built capacity in Nigeria was the counter-IED training incorporated into the 
Nigeria Police training curriculum.181   
The CVE program is designed to address the underlying causes of extremism and 
terrorism. Its main focus is to degrade the capacity and ability of terrorist organizations to 
elicit sympathy and boost recruitment. The CVE initiative involves constant engagement 
and confidence-building measures between the civil society and the security agencies. It 
177 U.S Department of State, “Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Asssistance to Nigeria,” DOS, 
May 14, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226072.htm. 
178 Pendleton, Actions Needed, 26. 
179 GlobalSeccurity.org, “Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans Sahara (OEF-TS),” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef-ts.htm. 




                                                 
also builds resilience among vulnerable communities, creates counterterrorist 
propaganda, information operations, and engages women in countering abnormal 
behavior that could lead to extremism at home and within their communities. Although 
no statistics are available on the number of Nigerian women who benefited from the CVE 
program, the rise of Nigerian women against the kidnapped schoolgirls shows an 
increased level of awareness.  
Statistics do reveal that terrorist incidents are increasing in Nigeria, which 
challenges the effectiveness of the counterterrorism programs.182 The issue is that the 
programs may not have addressed the problem in Nigeria because the initial focus of the 
TSCTP was the Sahel region. It has also been observed that TSCPC lacks a 
comprehensive strategy on either using the regional approach or the bilateral approach. 
For example, it was only after Boko Haram’s recent abductions that the United States 
sent special counterterrorism teams to Nigeria.  
4. Maritime Security Programs 
Capacity building programs in maritime security include the APS, African 
Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), maritime exercise, port security 
partnership, strategic maritime initiatives, and maritime domain awareness. Nigeria has 
participated in all U.S. initiatives considering its role in GOG security. For instance, 
Nigeria has actively participated in several AFRICOM’s APS maritime security exercises 
tagged Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS and has benefited from the Regional Maritime 
Awareness Capability (RMAC) program.  
The RMAC system is a DOD—specifically a Department of Navy—program, that 
would enable partner nations like Nigeria to monitor its maritime domain and the GOG 
against piracy and other transnational maritime crimes.183 It is a system of radars and 
sensors with an integrated automated identification system for tracking ships. The 
strategy is to install the systems in designated locations along the Nigerian coast for 
182 U.S. Department of State, “Boko Haram and U.S Counterterrorism.” 
183 Nigerian Navy, “Regional Maritme Awareness Capability Conference,” Nigerian Navy, 
http://www.navy.mil.ng/press/16.news#.U6L7rl64llI. 
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complete overlap. Currently, the systems have been installed and are fully operational in 
Lagos and Bonny. The RMAC system has also been installed in the republic and Sao 
Tome and Principe to overlap and share information with the Nigerian systems for 
effective regional maritime dominance.  
The U.S. Navy has trained several Nigerian Navy officers to operate and maintain 
the systems. During the RMAC training graduation ceremony held at the Lagos naval 
base, it was noted that the RMAC system gives a more precise data for Nigerian Navy 
vessels. Nevertheless, the poor operational state of ships and aircraft may hinder the 
effectiveness of the RMAC system. Thus, inadequate enforcement capability affects 
optimal usage of the system. 
In spite of all these initiatives, pirate attacks have not been reduced in the 
GOG.184 The increase in illegal activities, especially piracy, suggests that the programs 
have not translated into improved security. This situation also suggests that the programs 
may not be addressing the problems.185 Thus, the program should be reviewed to attend 
to more specific threats coupled with a strategy to acquire the requisite equipment for 
Nigeria’s security agencies. 
5. Excess Defense Articles Transfer 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are U.S. military equipment or materiel in excess 
of the approved force requirement or retention as enshrined in the U.S. foreign assistance 
Act of 1961. The articles could be from the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air 
Force, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The articles are 
transferred to U.S. allies, partner countries, or international organizations either on grant 
or sale. The articles on grant are transferred under the U.S. foreign military financing. 
The U.S. Congress approves the foreign military financing funds, the DOS allocates the 
funds for the eligible allies, and the DOD executes the transfer and training. The 
beneficiary countries of EDA transfer grant pay for the packing, crating, handling, and 
transportation. Similarly, the articles for sale are transferred under the U.S. foreign 
184 IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robery Against Ships.” 
185 Lyman, “Strategic Approach,” 49.  
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military sale, which also follows due process before approving the sale to the partner 
government.  
The U.S. government agency responsible for coordinating and administering EDA 
is the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency. EDAs have to be identified by the 
respective defense agencies before the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency carries 
out assessments in conjunction with the combatant commands to determine the 
beneficiary countries. The items are then offered in support of U.S. national security and 
foreign policy objectives. Additionally, the equipment helps in the modernization of the 
recipient nations’ security agencies. It also improves the interoperability of U.S. allied 
countries in multinational arenas and builds their capacity for legitimate self-defense. 
Despite the robust objective of the EDA, most of the recipients of the EDA are either 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries or traditional allies of the United 
States. African countries for the most part receive equipment that is no longer in service 
in the United States. For instance, Table 5 shows that the Nigerian Navy has been granted 
five U.S. Coast Guard vessels and one U.S. Navy ship. The Nigerian Army has received 
trailers and heavy trucks.   
Table 5.   EDA Transfer to Nigeria.186 
 
186 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Excess Defence Articles: EDA Data Base Tool,” DSCA, 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-eda. 
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Such transfers, while useful to Nigeria, will not adequately address the challenges 
the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Army are facing especially in the contemporary 
security environment of piracy and terrorism. Furthermore, neither interoperability nor 
the full realization of U.S. foreign policy can easily be achieved with this equipment. 
What Nigeria needs is EDA for desert warfare from Iraq and Afghanistan for the fight 
against Boko Haram. Boko Haram has acquired sophisticated military equipment stolen 
from Libya after Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and the fall of Gadhafi. Thus, specific 
and more sophisticated EDAs such as surveillance equipment will more likely yield the 
desired outcomes of the U.S. security initiative.  
C. SOFT-POWER PROGRAMS 
The soft-power programs are the security sector reform (SSR), the DOD HIV 
program, humanitarian assistance programs, and education and training programs. These 
programs are designed to develop best practices, rule of law, and respect for human rights 
in the security sector of partner nations.187 They are also aimed at fostering good 
relations and building trust between the U.S. forces and the host nation’s civil society.188 
Addressing issues that affect the daily life in civil society help to counter conspiracy 
theories and hostile tendencies. However, the suitability of DOD to carry out 
humanitarian assistance is debatable because the military is more focused on quick 
impact projects versus sustainable development.189 Also, some non-governmental 
organizations do not want to directly work with the military, which further creates 
friction in coordination.190 
1. Security Sector Reform 
Contemporary thinking holds that donor states should incorporate development or 
humanitarian programs along with security assistance initiatives. Although this concept 
187 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress (CRS Report No. CRL34639) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2008), 1, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf. 
188 Ibid., 8. 
189 Ibid., 18. 
190 Ibid., 19. 
 57 
                                                 
has long been the principle of U.S. foreign policy, it became popularly known as security 
sector reform (SSR) after Clare Shot, a former UK minister for international development 
stressed it during a public speech in London 1998.191 SSR hinges on the need to balance 
effective development of institutions against the security apparatus to safeguard them. It 
proposed that states should be able to set reasonable limits for security and development 
imperatives in such a way that the tradeoffs would not reduce effectiveness. SSR 
therefore covers all U.S. foreign policy initiatives that bear on security and development. 
Observers have noted that early reforms, especially during the post-independence era in 
Africa, were primarily focused on modernizing the military without respect to good 
governance or democratic oversight. Thus, most of the military in the beneficiary 
countries either perpetuate themselves in power or serve the interests of the donor 
countries.192   
SSR sets out to professionalize partner military forces and strengthen civilian 
oversight. It calls for a holistic approach rather than a single or isolated reform. Herbert 
Wulf and Michael Brzoska have identified four dimensions for a holistic SSR. These 
dimensions are political, economic, social, and institutional. The political dimension 
entails the promotion of good governance, democratic control, accountability, and civil 
society participation. The economic dimension requires prudent use of resources to 
balance development and security needs of the state. The social dimension is basically the 
guarantee of citizens’ security, safety, freedom, and wellbeing. The institutional 
dimension involves professionalizing and defining the roles of various security agencies 
for accountability and service to the state.193 
In executing SSR, various factors must be taken into account such as the 
differences and commonalities between countries, the will of the partner countries to 
reform, and the situation in the countries. In this regard, Wulf developed a scale to 
191 Herbert Wulf, “Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries,” Berghof 
Foundation, 2, http://wulf-herbert.de/Berghofdialogue2.pdf. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Wulf, “Security Sector Reform,” 2. 
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measure the potential for reform in some countries (Table 6). The scale presupposes that 
post-conflict countries have more potential for reform than countries at war. 
Table 6.   Scale of Potential for Security Sector Reform.194 
 
Wulf argues that the priorities in war-prone countries or countries at war diminish 
the potential for SSR. Furthermore, failed states lack the preconditions and institutions 
necessary for SSR to take off, while countries undergoing mediation have the opportunity 
to embrace SSR in so far as it is included in the agreement between parties for the post-
conflict phase. For example, the transition executive committee during the Fredrick de 
Klerk regime in South Africa not only agreed on reforming intelligence but also produced 
a white paper based on Australian, Canadian, and the British models for reform.  
In the case of countries in transformation—for example, the former Soviet-bloc 
states—incentives and sanctions, as well as external pressure have proven effective.195 
For example, in Romania, incentives to join the European Union accelerated the 
democratization of intelligence and the military.196 Countries in transition have the 
potential to embrace SSR fully once the security forces come to terms with the new 
194 Ibid., 6. 
195 Keneth R. Dambroski, “Transforming Intelligence in South Africa,” in Reforming Intelligence, ed. 
Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Bora s(Austin,TX: University of Texas Press, 2007). 
196 Florina Cristiana Matei, “Romania’s Intelligence Community: From and Instrument of 
Dictatorship to Serving Democracy,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 
4 (2007): 672; Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei, “Introduction,” in The Routledge Handbook of 
Civil – Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2012), 9.  
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paradigm with the help of external donor countries. Similarly, in post-conflict countries, 
previous peace agreements and external support helped in SSR. 
Interestingly, Nigeria was not considered in Wulf’s tool. Perhaps the long period 
of the military regime and the peaceful transition to democracy made the categorization 
somewhat difficult. However, in terms of transition to democracy and the process of 
consolidation, Nigeria seems to be on the right path. Therefore, in line with Wulf’s tool, 
the U.S. government’s programs in Nigeria are ongoing and have full potential for 
success.197  
The U.S. government has been evolving measures to optimize and integrate the 
efforts of DOS, USAID, and DOD for effective SSR.198 Similarly, President Obama 
noted in the U.S. Strategy for SSA: “Strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, 
sustained by a deep commitment to the rule of law, generate greater prosperity and 
stability, and meet with greater success in mitigating conflict and ensuring security.”199 
Such a declaration shows the United States’ commitment to SSR in Africa. The United 
Nations, NATO, United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations, United 
Nations Development Program, European Union, UK Department for International 
Development, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have 
developed coherent approaches to SSR.200   
The U.S. government’s SSR program places a high priority on the unity of effort 
among all the agencies responsible for administering aid. It also recognizes the effective 
coordination with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
multinational partners, and the host nation. For instance, USAID endorsed the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s publication, Security Sector 
Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, on behalf of U.S. government.201 
197 IHS, “Nigerian Armed Forces.”  
198 U.S. Department of State, “Security Sector Reform” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 
2009), 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf. 
199 U.S. Government, United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, 1. 
200 U.S. Department of State, “Security Sector Reform,” 2. 
201 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, the U.S. SSR program operates within the framework of six guiding 
principles, which include supporting host nation ownership, incorporating principles of 
good governance and respect for human rights, balancing operational support with 
institutional reforms, linking security and justice, and doing no harm. Essentially, the 
programs are designed to address the host nation’s needs and priorities. The programs 
must also include oversight mechanisms, training and infrastructure, robust 
communications systems to foster awareness and transparency, and measures to prevent 
unintended consequences. Some of the security programs in Nigeria encompass SSR, but 
no holistic program for SSR like the United States’ program in Liberia.202 Thus, there is 
no overarching data to harmonize SSR in Nigeria. 
2. DOD HIV Program 
The U.S. DOD has several HIV programs for the armed forces of partner African 
nations. The programs include HIV prevention, infrastructural development and support, 
and treatment and care. The philosophy of the programs is that HIV/AIDS affects 
military readiness and, by extension, the security and stability of the states. The DOD 
HIV programs are not duplicates of PEPFAR but are mechanisms to implement the core 
objective of PEPFAR for the host military and civilian communities. For example, 13 
PEPFAR countries have benefited from direct DOD HIV programs tailored to their 
needs.203  
The DOD HIV programs include DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, the U.S 
Military HIV Research Program, the Uniformed Services University of the Health 
Sciences, and the Defense Institute of Medical Operations. The DOD HIV/AIDS 
Prevention Program is the primary DOD agency for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, 
and care for partner countries. This agency coordinates funding and the DOD agencies 
that contribute to PEPFAR.  
202 Mark Malan, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings,” SSI 
USAWC, March 14, 2008, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=855. 
203 U.S. State Department, “The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: 
Department of Defense,” DOD, http://www.pepfar.gov/about/agencies/c19397.htm. 
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The U.S Military HIV Research Program is a research-based program dedicated 
to HIV monitoring, vaccine development, treatment and care. Similarly, the Uniformed 
Services University of the Health Sciences program provides health support military 
operations including policies for HIV testing before and after military deployments. This 
program also provides psychological counseling for personnel. The Defense Institute of 
Medical Operations focuses on healthcare management through education and training. 
The Institute has provided medical capacity development and training for effective HIV 
policy and prevention to the medical communities in many countries.204  
In Nigeria, the Walter Reed Program-Nigeria is the main implementer of the 
DOD PEPFAR program.205 The Walter Reed program has collaborated with the Nigerian 
Ministry of Defense in establishing centers of excellence for HIV testing at 20 sites as 
shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12.  PEPFAR Centers of Excellence for HIV Testing.206 
204 Ibid. 
205 WRP-N, “Walter Reed Program-Nigeria,” WRP-N official website, http://www.wrp-
n.org/?page_id=371. 
206 Darrell Singer, “Building a Partnership through Pepfar: The Nigerian Ministry of Defence- U.S. 




                                                 
The sites have the capacity for diagnosing, caring, and treating from 5 to 50 
patients daily. This capacity and facilities have enabled the program to collate up-to-date 
statistics of HIV cases for care and treatment, as Figure 13 reveals. 
 
Figure 13.  Patient Metrics 2006‒2009.207 
The detailed breakdown has helped the Nigerian MOD and the DOD to 
effectively manage and improve the prevention and care procedures. Similarly, statistics 
on a national scale have shown that HIV prevalence in Nigeria is decreasing. Thus, the 
PEPFAR and DOD HIV program could be considered a success. However, the recent 
outbreak and lethality of Ebola in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and a few cases in 
Nigeria suggest that the United States requires a holistic infectious disease capacity 




                                                 
3. Humanitarian Assistance Programs 
The DOD humanitarian assistance programs support the U.S. foreign policy 
strategic goals and the objectives set in the U.S. Strategy for SSA. The Defense and 
Security Cooperation Agency manage the humanitarian programs. The programs include 
humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, the excess property program, 
and the funded transportation program.208 The objectives include strengthening host 
nation’s capacity to respond to emergencies, cultivating a good relationship between U.S. 
personnel and the host nation’s government and civil society, and countering violent 
extremism.  
The overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid account is the main driver of 
the program. The activities include the renovation of clinics, schools, and orphanages, 
and construction/repair of water wells and basic infrastructure.209 Additionally, 
humanitarian assistance covers the transfer of non-lethal excess property such as disaster 
relief material, medical equipment, education supplies, household goods and furniture.210 
Some non-lethal property transfer for fiscal year 2012 is shown in Table 7. 
208 U.S. Department of State, “Humanitarian Operation,” http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/
fy2012_ha_report_to_congress_submitted.pdf. 
209 Ibid.  
210 Defense and Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Report on 
Humanitarian Assistance (Washington, DC: U.S. DSCA, 2013), 4. 
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Table 7.   Non-lethal Property Transfer in 2012.211 
 
The table shows that Nigeria received medical supplies and equipment in the third 
quarter and household goods/furniture in the fourth quarter of 2012. The criteria for 
selecting which country gets which aid and when it gets it is not very clear. Non-lethal 
property transfers are driven by specific needs of the target country. Additionally, human 
security assistance programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, have a 
primary criteria based on the World Bank’s threshold of countries under the upper-middle 
income, but not the challenges a country faces.212 Income level or gross domestic product 
does not necessarily translate into good quality of life, as is the case in Nigeria. 
4. Education and Training Programs 
Education and training programs like the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program 
(CTFP) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) are designed to 
educate and train mid-level and senior officers of partner countries in selected U.S. 
government institutions. The programs are DOS funded, but administered by DOD 
211 Ibid. 
212 Curt Tarnoff, Millenium Challenge Corporation (CRS Report No. RL32427) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2014), 3, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32427.pdf. 
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through the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency.213 IMET and CTFP’s core 
objective is to develop requisite knowledge and build a global network of terrorism 
experts at operational and strategic levels. IMET has two categories—IMET-1 and 
expanded IMET (E-IMET). The IMET-1 covers professional military education, English 
language training, and courses in the services’ war colleges and other institutions in the 
United States to enhance interoperability and capacity of partner nations in joint 
operations. The programs under IMET-1 include national security courses, politico-
military policy, and specialized/professional military courses.214  
E-IMET has been conducted both in institutions across the United States and by 
mobile teams of experts in host countries. The courses include civil-military relations, 
human resource management, human rights, and military justice. The value of E-IMET is 
that its programs allow civilians (either elected officials or representatives of the civil 
society involved in security matters) to participate in such educational programs, along 
with the armed forces.215 The schools handling the training include the Naval Justice 
School in Newport, Rhode Island, the Center for Civil-Military Relations and Defense 
Resource Management Institute, and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey 
California.216 One overarching goal of the education is for participants to understand the 
United States’ way of life, which has a far-reaching effect.217 Nevertheless, curricula 
include global experiences. Table 8 is a breakdown of U.S. foreign military training in 
Nigeria for fiscal years 2011 and 2012.  
213 Serafino, Department of Defence Role in Foreign Assistance, 52. 
214 Ibid., 53. 
215 In many emerging democracies civilians lack expertise in security issues; such courses have been 
useful in increasing civilian knowledge in security and defense. 
216 Serafino, Department of Defence Role in Foreign Assistance, 52. 
217 Ibid. 
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Table 8.   U.S. Foreign Military Training in Nigeria, 2011‒2012.218 
 
The data reveal that during 2011 to 2012, the United States trained about 13,448 
students for approximately $17.7 million. Specifically, CTFP trained 31 students, while 
IMET trained 56 students from 2011 to 2012. These trainings do not seem to be yielding 
the desired outcomes in Nigeria because terrorism is increasing. The problem may not be 
with the training, but with the lack of on-ground capacity to put the training into action. 
Nigeria lacks surveillance equipment, combat helicopters, and special weapons to track 
and neutralize terrorists hiding in the ungoverned spaces around its northeastern 
borders.219 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The U.S. strategy for SSA, which enshrines all the developmental and security 
programs, could be considered an ideal because of its robustness. Although the programs 
appear to cover the key areas of security in SSA, the reality on the ground in most SSA 
countries, including Nigeria, does not produce the expected outcomes. Chapter III has 
218 U.S. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Training- Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012 
(Washington, DC: U.S. DOD, 2012), 11‒12, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/197595.pdf. 





                                                 
revealed how the initiatives like AFRICOM, counterterrorism, and maritime security 
programs partially address human security problems. For the most part, some barriers, 
like human rights abuses, have to be addressed before programs are implemented or 
funds are released. For instance, Nigeria faces the dilemma of human rights abuses 
against security assistance. There is no standard the for U.S. threshold of human right 
abuses because in some countries full sanctions are applied, while other countries are 
merely admonished.  
Lack of on-the-ground capability among the security agencies is evident in 
Nigeria. Without the requisite platforms and materiel to enforce laws or embark on 
operations against criminality or violent extremism, desired outcomes cannot be realized. 
For example, a lack of intelligence and surveillance equipment have made it impossible 
for the Nigerian security agencies to track or rescue the 276 kidnapped schoolgirls since 
April 2014. Similarly, the RMAC system is only as good as an adequate naval presence 
to intercept and arrest pirates or other criminals in the Nigerian waters and the GOG at 
large.  
Lack of a coherent strategy and the differences in the mission of the agencies 
administering aid also affects the outcomes of the programs. For instance, ACOTA is a 
DOS funded program with huge military activities requiring personnel of the DOD to act 
as mentors and advisors. Similarly, the TSCTP is a DOS program with overlapping roles 
of the DOD and USAID. Problems of administering DOD staff under a DOS or USAID 
coordinator may arise, especially if the program is a DOD-dedicated program.  
Inconsistent funding and misconceptions could also be an impediment to the 
continuity and effectiveness of some programs. Mali is a typical example where a sharp 
reduction in funding led to the discontinuation of a peace-building project in 2006. In 
retrospect, the current instability in Mali could be linked to such inconsistencies. Algeria, 
on the other hand, has not been disposed to TSCTP assistance since 2005. One reason 
could be the United States’ misperception of the problems in Algeria or Algeria’s 
misconception of the United States’ intensions. Further, such misperceptions by the 
United States could be responsible for its treating Boko Haram as mere domestic 
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terrorists until the situation went out of control with potential threats against U.S. 
interests.  
This chapter also finds that the effectiveness of most of the programs depends on 
specific not embedded human security programs. Much of the U.S. human security and 
development assistance is quite selective and ties funding to criteria. For example, the 
Millenium Challenge Corporation, which is an independent U.S. initiative, focused on 
human security issues, such as poverty and illiteracy, is open only to lower income or 
lower-middle-income countries. Important criteria such as the prevalence rates of these 
problems should be used. Gross domestic product does not necessarily translate to better 
living or health conditions, as is the case of Nigeria, the largest economy in Africa after 
the rebasing exercise conducted in April 2014. Consequently, an in-depth analysis of the 
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IV. GAPS IN U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA: ISSUES 
TO BE ADDRESSED 
Juxtaposing Nigeria’s security challenges examined in Chapter II and U.S. 
security initiatives as they appear in Chapter III uncovers some gaps that impede progress 
and the achievement of the desired outcomes. This chapter is comprised of three sections 
that address the gaps in the security programs and proposes some remedies and 
recommendations. This chapter also discusses the state security paradigm for solving 
these problems, also known as the hard-power approach or human security paradigm. 
This chapter takes up each of these broad problems in turn. 
A. PROBLEMS BLOCKING PROGRESS OF U.S. SECURITY INITIATIVES 
This section examines the three problems previously uncovered. First, programs 
may not be addressing the actual problems on the ground. Second, even if the programs 
address the problems, U.S. bureaucratic bottlenecks—especially interagency 
coordination, domestic politics, and funding—affect the outcomes. Third, a lack of 
capacity and capability on the part of the Nigerian security agencies forms a major barrier 
to the success of the programs. 
1. Problem One: Program Mismatch 
The program-problem mismatch stems from the complexity of delineating what 
U.S. national security imperatives should drive programs and to what extent some 
tradeoffs can be made. Additionally, religious or cultural differences could lead to 
misperceptions and misdiagnosis of the problems. Sometimes communal rivalries could 
also undermine a program because administering humanitarian assistance, such as 
construction of a well in one local government, might be misunderstood as the United 
States having a special interest. Furthermore, the dilemma between the regional programs 
and country specific programs also creates gaps that affect outcomes. In Nigeria, a lack of 
multinational approaches to the Boko Haram insurgency, as in the case of Mali, has also 
contributed to poor outcomes.  
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a. U.S. Security Interests versus African Security Problems 
One of the problems of the U.S. security initiatives is that they tend to focus more 
on U.S. security interests than African security problems. As Guy Lamb aptly puts it, “It 
is highly uncommon for major powers to pursue foreign policy that prioritizes interests 
and needs of other countries over national interests.”220 Lamb’s argument resonates in 
most U.S. foreign policy engagements following World War I. United States’ policy only 
changed from isolationism to full participation in World War II when Japan challenged 
its national interests by attacking Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The domino theory, 
which was the rationale for the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, did not fully strike the 
balance between U.S. national interests and that of the Vietnamese. The contemporary 
GWOT only took affect after 9/11 when terrorists directly challenged the United States 
and had already become more lethal and ideological. 
Notably, most nations would do the same, but problems arise when good 
intentions are characterized by conspiracy and a lack of transparency. For instance, some 
scholars contend that U.S. AFRICOM is a U.S. ploy to militarize Africa. At the same 
time, the minimal involvement of the United States in the crisis in the Ivory Coast versus 
its involvement in Libya seems to support the lack-of-transparency argument. To be fair, 
one of the justifications for the U.S. action in Libya is to stop Gadhafi from killing his 
people. Further, AFRICOM is also seen as a U.S. reaction to the growing influence of 
China in Africa. The African Union was not engaged enough on the formation of 
AFRICOM until after controversies started cropping up. These narratives breed suspicion 
of the United States’ real intentions. Reconciling where to draw the line between U.S. 
national security priorities and foreign policy objectives is a major area of divergence.  
As much as the United States seeks to protect its national interest first, it should 
not do so to the detriment of the goodwill enshrined in it foreign policy objectives. Some 
objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Africa include the promotion of good governance and 
the provision of humanitarian assistance against poverty, hunger, and diseases. Nigeria, 
as well as other African countries, desires such assistance. Nonetheless, the criteria 
220 Lamb, “Parading U.S. Security Interests as African Security Policy,” 50. 
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required for countries to get the aid make it almost impossible to achieve. Such 
conditions create more lacunae between programs and problems.  
Most policymakers and scholars agree on the significance of Nigeria as Robert P. 
Jackson, the principal deputy assistant secretary, Africa Bureau, notes:221 
A peaceful and stable Nigeria is crucially important to the future of Africa, 
and we cannot stay on the sidelines if it stumbles. Nigeria has the 
continent’s largest population and biggest economy. We look to Nigeria as 
a partner in our quest to help Africans lead lives free of violence and filled 
with possibility. As an engine of growth, a fountainhead of art and 
industry, and a political giant, Nigeria is vital to the success of President 
Obama’s 2012 Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. As we implement that 
strategy, we are focusing on building a democratic, prosperous, and secure 
Nigeria. 
Yet Nigeria’s security environment complicates this vision. As the United States 
world threat report of March 13, 2013 revealed that “African stability would be 
threatened not only by ... extremist attacks in Nigeria, but also by the collapse of 
governance in northern Mali and renewed conflict in the Great Lakes region.222 This 
argument was corroborated by a Nigerian scholar, Daniel Agbiboa when he noted that 
“the group’s (Boko Haram’s) active gnawing at the religious, ethnic, and regional fault-
lines of Nigeria not only threatens the country’s peace and unity, but holds serious 
transnational implications.”223 Similarly, despite the UN’s deployment of the action of 
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and now the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and 
international support from France and the United States, extremism in northern Mali still 
threatens the country’s stability. 
Nigeria did not receive the support Mali got from the United Nations and the 
United States. The current situation in Nigeria typifies the primacy of U.S. national 
221 Robert P. Jackson, “#Bringbackourgirls: Addressing the Growing Threat of Boko Haram,” DOS, 
May 15,2014, 2, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jackson_Testimony1.pdf. 
222 James R. Clapper, “World Intelligence Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 
March 12, 2013, 19, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence. 
223 Daniel Agbiboa, “The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram Versus the State,” 
International Journal of Stability and Security Development 2, no. 3 (2013): 1. 
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security over Nigeria’s security problems. For example, despite the ongoing debate about 
the need to support Nigeria against Boko Haram, the United States stopped Israel from 
the supplying American-made Chinook helicopters in September 2014.224 Furthermore, 
GAO’s combating terrorism report, Figure 14, begs many questions about the level of 
U.S. assistance to combat Boko Haram.  
 
Figure 14.  Selected Terrorist Incidents in Northwest Africa, 2009‒2014.225 
The timeline shows that the lethality and frequency of Boko Haram attacks far 
outweighs that of Mauritania al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates. The 
report does not include the kidnapping of the schoolgirls or the beheading of a Nigerian 
Air force pilot.226 The world witnessed the swift U.S. reaction against ISIS, including a 
proposal to arm such controversial militant groups as the Islamic Front.227 Weapons were 
even air dropped to support the campaign against ISIS.228 If Boko Haram had carried out 
the decapitations of foreign nationals, perhaps the response would have been different.    
224 ThisDay, “U.S Blocks Nigeria’s Purchase of Chinook Helicopters from Israel,” September 23, 
2014, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/us-blocks-nigeria-s-purchase-of-chinook-helicopters-from-israel/
189710/. 
225 Pendleton, Combating Terrorism, 7. 
226 The beheaded Nigerian Air Force Pilot, Wing Commander Chimda Hedima, is not just a colleague, 
but also a personal friend. He was my roommate for a few months at the 2011–2012 Defense Services 
Command and Staff College course, Bangladesh. He is a complete gentleman officer and he remains my 
hero.  





                                                 
Until recently, the main U.S. strategic interest has been to neutralize Al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates, with little emphasis on groups outside this category. If U.S. 
policymakers had requested through, for example, Congressional Research Service 
reports, GAO reports, and congressional hearings, information on Boko Haram earlier, 
the security problems of Nigeria might not have escalated to this level. The reports would 
have made appropriate recommendations on countering Boko Haram such as a 
multinational approach, more robust intelligence, and more weapons delivery to the 
Nigerian security agencies.  
Admittedly, Nigerian security agencies are partly responsible for the aggravated 
security situation. Repressive tactics used for earlier extremists like the Miatatsine sect 
and the Niger Delta Militants further provoked Boko Haram violence. Some scholars 
contend that only transparency will help identify common grounds that will meet the 
aspirations of U.S. national interests and those of partner nations.229 Thus, while U.S. 
interests come first, fully engaging partner countries in identifying the immediate issues 
that need to be addressed would be more strategic for the United States.  
b. Misperception or Misdiagnosis? 
Misconception and misdiagnosis of the security problems is also a major 
drawback in the one-size-fits-all approach. For example, some Nigerian officials perceive 
U.S. assistance as meddling with its internal affairs, while the United States is more 
concerned about rule of law and good governance.230 Additionally, while specific 
instances in Nigeria have not been identified, Algeria’s refusal to be part of the TSCTP 
and its open denouncement of AFRICOM stemmed from the misperception of the United 
States’ intention and its preference for bilateral engagements.231  
Misdiagnosis is more evident in the DOD humanitarian assistance programs. A 
regional assistance model may not adequately address a national problem. The DOD’s 
229 Jessica Piombo, “U.S. Africa Policy: Rhetoric Versus Reality,” Current History 111, no. 745 
(2012): 79. 
230 Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, 19. 
231 Alexis Arieff, Algeria: Current Issues (CRS Report No. RS21532) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2011), I, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21532.pdf. 
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humanitarian assistance in Djibouti during Ramadan in 2009 almost led to an unintended 
consequence as some of the clothing distributed offended the Muslims.232 In Nigeria, 
PEPFAR did not initially cater to malaria and tuberculosis, which kills more Nigerians. 
PEPFAR had to be expanded to cover the Presidential Malaria Initiative.233 If the U.S. 
agencies had worked closely with Nigeria health officials and not just reacted to the 
global outcry regarding HIV, the initiative would have covered malaria and tuberculosis 
from the onset.  
c. Regional versus Country Programming 
Prioritizing regional over national programs creates a stumbling block for U.S. 
programs. The regional approach fosters cooperation and integration toward addressing 
common security challenges, but it all depends of the geopolitical situation of the region. 
In North Africa, for example, Morocco was not active with the TSCTP because of the 
U.S. engagement with Algeria.234 Morocco is not happy with Algeria’s support to the 
Polisario Front, a militant group in dispute with Morocco over Western Sahara.235 In 
West Africa, however, the situation is different because apart from internal skirmishes, 
most countries live in harmony with their neighbors. Notably, Nigeria and Cameroon 
have resolved their territorial dispute over the Bakassi peninsula.236 Thus, regional 
initiatives will have less friction in West Africa than in North Africa. 
Nonetheless, the regional approach tends to subsume pressing security challenges 
at the national level. For instance, since conceptualization, TSCTP was a regional 
initiative so less impetus was given to national problems. At the regional level, delegates 
or participants from a particular country cannot fully address their issues at the expense 
232 Pendleton, Interagency Collaboration Practices, 16. 
233 Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, 20. 
234 Vish Sakthivel, “Kerry’s Visit to Morocco and Algeria: Navigating between Competitors,” The 
Washington Institute, November 4, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kerrys-
visit-to-morocco-and-algeria-navigating-between-competitors. 
235 Alexis Arieff, Morocco: Current Issues (CRS Report No. RS21579) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2013), 12, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21579.pdf. 
236 United Nations, “Nigeria, Cameroon Sign Agreement Ending Decades-Old Border Dispute; Sets 
Procedures for Nigerian Withdrawal from Bakassi Peninsula,” June 12, 2006, http://www.un.org/press/en/
2006/afr1397.doc.htm. 
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of other participants. The initial focus of the TSTCP on the Sahel region has had negative 
consequences on a strategic partner like Nigeria.  
Similarly, the regional maritime security programs do not address a specific 
country scenario, such as oil theft in the Niger Delta. Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 
is more focused on transnational maritime crimes in the GOG. Notably, the pirates do not 
live on the high seas because they are the same criminals that engage in local crimes. 
Thus, Nigeria needs specific programs to build capacities against local crimes. Such a 
capability would deny the criminals freedom of action both in Nigerian and international 
waters. 
d. Lack of a Multinational Approach to Combat Boko Haram Terrorism 
A lack of multinational efforts against Boko Haram has also contributed to why 
some of the U.S. programs have not produced the desired outcomes. The main problem 
has been whether the U.S. government should designate Boko Haram as an foreign 
terrorist organization. For instance, Nigerian experts cautioned the United States against 
being perceived as supporting the Christian cause while the United States was concerned 
about the heavy-handedness of Nigerian security agencies.237 These arguments left the 
bulk of the counterterrorism response to Nigeria alone.  
It was not until several kidnappings of expatriate workers and the 2011 bombing 
of the UN building in Abuja that the United States called for the first congressional 
hearing on Boko Haram.238 Furthermore, Boko Haram espouses a Jihadi ideology, which 
transcends Nigeria’s borders.239 Boko Haram also emulates ISIS and its horrible acts of 
beheading captives.240 Using the media for propaganda and countering any government’s 
success shows how technologically literate some of its members are.  
237 Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, 14. 
238 Ibid., 21. 
239 Simonelli, “Boko Haram.” 
240 Stephanie Linning, “Boko Haram Releases Video Showing Beheading of Nigerian Air Force Pilot 




                                                 
The question is why the United States and other countries waited for a singular 
event that sparked international condemnation to open a more structured discussion and 
offer assistance. Even with increased surveillance and U.S. advisers over the past six 
months, the schoolgirls have not been found. Instead more schools are being attacked and 
students kidnapped. If such measures had been exercised before the fall of Ghadafi, Boko 
Haram probably would not have acquired the weapons it has today. Additionally, the 
U.S. focus on Mauritania al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates gave Boko 
Haram more time to recruit and strategize. Further, if the current cooperation between 
regional countries, especially those bordering Nigeria, had been in place, perhaps the 
situation would have been better.  
e. Disconnect between Training and Implementation 
The gaps between training and implementation affect the outcomes of the U.S. 
security initiative. Statistics mostly reveal the number of personnel trained, but not how 
effective are these personnel, or where they were deployed after the training?241 
Additionally, the mobile training teams who conduct the CTFP and IMET programs do 
not choose the students they get for the training. An overriding criterion is the minimum 
number of students required for the course to be held and administrative vetting on 
whether any participant or his regiment is involved in human rights abuses.242 Students 
who do not pass the vetting are replaced. Nonetheless, the replaced student may simply 
be cleared, yet lack the requisite qualifications for the course.  
The Office of Defense Cooperation cannot completely determine the type of 
training program nominees have received. To be fair, the high level of scrutiny based on 
U.S. standards can hardly be met; however, the United States needs to develop a practical 
method of evaluating the efficacy of the training. In Nigeria for instance, how does the 
United States determine the number of students trained for the TSCTP actually deployed 
in counterterrorism related roles? How are the maritime security programs implemented? 
Do the U.S. programs include a plan to monitor progress before fully disengaging? What 
241 Pendleton, Actions Needed, 4. 
242 Ibid. 
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should be the threshold for the U.S. disengagement? Such questions ought to guide how 
programs are administered. 
2. Problem Two: U.S. Bureaucratic Bottlenecks 
U.S. bureaucratic bottlenecks can manifest from political party agendas in 
Washington and different cultures/missions of agencies administering aid. Further, the 
public opinion in the United States may either enhance or aggravate the problem. This 
section considers interagency coordination, inconsistent funding, and human rights issues 
as they impinge on program delivery.  
The multi-agency and multifaceted approach to the U.S. administration of aid or 
security programs creates coordination problems. Different agencies have different 
missions and cultures. For example, the Treasury Department handles multilateral aid; 
USAID handles bilateral assistance, while DOS and DOD are responsible for military 
and security related programs.243 Some overlaps could have dire consequences such as 
fragmentation, inefficiency, and incoherence.  
Further, the problems may affect how the U.S. agencies coordinate with other 
donors in a particular country.244 For instance, during a donor coordination meeting in 
South Africa, two representatives of the U.S. agencies had never met prior to the 
meeting.245 Also, DOD personnel may not want to report to the USAID representative on 
the ground. Although there have been no reported cases in Nigeria, one of the major areas 
of conflict is when the DOD carries out humanitarian assistance, which is the purview of 
DOS or USAID.  
243 Curt Tarnoff, Foriegn Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy (CRS Report 
No.R40213) (Wshington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), I, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/157097.pdf. 
244 Marian Leonardo Lawson, Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of Development 




                                                 
3. Inconsistent Funding 
Fluctuation in the funding of most U.S. programs hinders the attainment of some 
important objectives of U.S. security programs. The sharp reduction in funding to Mali in 
2006 halted a peace-building project in the northern part of the country.246 In hindsight, 
the situation in Mali today could be partly attributed to the discontinuity of such projects. 
Similarly, the funds Nigeria received under the TSCTP program is not commensurate 
with the scope and dynamics of combatting Boko Haram. It is important for policymakers 
in the United States to develop threat-based criteria for the distribution of funds for a 
particular program. 
4. Human Rights Issues versus the Severity of the Problem 
Respect for human rights resonates as an important condition to qualify for U.S. 
developmental and security assistance. Human rights vetting or the Leahy law, the 
brainchild of Senator Patrick Leahy, prevents the United States from giving assistance to 
a country if there is credible evidence that individuals or units have committed human 
rights abuses with impunity.247 The United States not only sees the Leahy law as a moral 
obligation, but also a core national interest.248 However, what is the tradeoff between a 
grave security situation and human rights abuses? According to Congressman Chris 
Smith, “Laws our congress created to prevent our alliances with rogue military and 
security forces are being blamed for making our assistance difficult.”249  
246 Pendleton, “Actions Needed,” 26. 
247 Nina M. Serafino et al., “Leahy Law,” Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue 
Overview (CRS Report No. R43361) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43361.pdf. 
248 Elisa Massimino, “Testimony of Elisa Massimino on ‘Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond’ 
Congressional Hearing,” July 10, 2014, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/testimony-elisa-
massimino-human-rights-vetting-nigeria-and-beyond-congressional-hearing. 
249 Christopher H. Smith, Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress, 2014), 1, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2014/7/31/extensions-of-remarks-
section/article/E1290-1. 
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Nigerian security agencies have been accused of extra-judicial killings and 
brutality against suspected extremists and Boko Haram.250 These abuses were committed 
by only a small percentage of Nigerian security agencies. As of 2012, about 187 military 
units and 173 police units have been vetted, and yet few have been trained or equipped to 
combat terrorism.251 The provision of the Leahy law allows for cleared units or those that 
have been renamed or replaced to be assisted. For example, the United States supported a 
country without much scrutiny after serious human right abuses had been committed. In 
Columbia, about 500 units committed over 3,000 extrajudicial executions, yet only a few 
were sanctioned, and U.S. assistance returned.252 So why is the Nigerian case either over 
politicized or different?  
The United States is still not disposed to provide weapons to the Nigerian 
military.253 Situations like these are counter-productive especially when a country shows 
evidence of compliance, and the security problem created by Boko Haram is severe. 
Nigeria suffered the same fate during the Biafran war, when the United State refused to 
approve the sale of 106mm ammunition. Unfortunately, the end result will be a military 
ill-equipped to fight terrorism. Strategic partners like Nigeria should be treated more 
strategically: a balance between carrots and sticks.  
5. Problem Three: Incapacity of the Nigerian Security Agencies 
The Nigerian security agencies are not operating at an optimum state. 
Additionally, the size of the military has shrunk by about 50 percent in the last three 
decades. While many years of military rule could be attributed to the poor operational 
state, the same cannot be said for the declining personnel numbers. Thus, dwindling 
250 Lauren Ploch, Hearing: Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2014), 6, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20140710/102447/
HHRG-113-FA16-Wstate-BlanchardL-20140710.pdf. 
251 Ibid., 7. 
252 FOR, Report: Military Assistance and Human Rights: Colombia, U.S. Accountability, and Global 
Implications (New York: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 2010), iii, http://forusa.org/sites/default/files/
uploads/militaryaid100729web.pdf. 
253 ThisDay, “U.S. Blocks Nigeria’s Purchase of Chinook Helicopters from Israel.”  
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intelligence capability and the operational state of the Nigerian security agencies help to 
identify why these gaps affect the outcomes of U.S. security initiatives. 
a. Weak CT Capability and Technical Intelligence Architecture 
Traditionally, most of the security agencies fighting terrorism were not 
established for that purpose. So the formation of inter-agency taskforces without the 
requisite training in CT has been responsible for the huge gaps in CT operations. For 
example, the joint task force for Operation Restore Hope in the Niger Delta established in 
2003 comprises intelligence detachments from the main security agencies.254 
Nonetheless, a lack of technical intelligence apparatus such as cryptographic and 
surveillance equipment affected the success of the operation.255 The situation seems to be 
the same with the current joint task force for Operation Restore Order established against 
Boko Haram in 2011. 
The agencies lack core capabilities such as counterinsurgency training, robust 
intelligence equipment; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives 
countermeasures equipment, among others.256 For instance, a cult group in Nasarawa 
States of Nigeria disarmed and slaughtered 30 members of the Nigerian police in 
2013.257 If the Nigerian police had counterinsurgency skills, the approach or tactics 
against the cult group would have saved more lives. 
Additionally, a lack of robust intelligence capabilities in Nigeria may have been 
responsible for poor outcomes from increased U.S. intelligence assistance since April 
2014.258 These incidents, along with several others, re-enforce the need to provide the 
254 Ngboawaji Daniel Nte, “An Analysis of Intelligence Support to Security Operations in Nigeria: A 
Review of Some Joint Task Force Operations,” Peace and Security Review 5, no. 9 (2013): 4. 
255 Ibid., 14. 
256 Department of Homeland Security, “Target Capabilities List: A Companion to National 
Preparedness and Guidelines,” September 2007, 115, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/
tcl.pdf. 
257 BBC, “Nigeria Attack: Nasarawa Cult Ambush ‘Kills 30 Police’,” BBC, May 9, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22462225. 
258 IHS, “Nigerian Armed Forces.” 
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security agencies with necessary CT capabilities. It will help streamline deployments, 
reduce unnecessary causalities, and prevent inter-agency conflicts.   
A first step is the introduction of a CT curriculum in the security institutions or 
development of a standard CT intelligence architecture. Another option is to develop 
intelligence and surveillance capability including a limited drone fleet. Such a fleet would 
provide the much needed real-time intelligence of insurgents for timely decision making. 
Aside from the legal implications of using drones across international boundaries, current 
GWOT in Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria proves the effectiveness of drones against 
terrorists.  
b. Operational State of the Nigerian Armed Forces 
The operational state of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) is also responsible 
for unpredictable outcomes in U.S. security operations. The Nigerian armed forces’ major 
problem today is not professionalism, but inadequate or obsolete equipment to execute 
operations.259 Additionally, the strength of the armed forces is small compared to the size 
of the population. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
database, the personnel strength of the AFN decreased from 134,000 in 1985 to 79,000 in 
2003.260  Nigeria’s military personnel and defense expenditure is compared with that of 
other African countries as shown in Table 9. 
259 Ibid. 
260 SIPRI, “Armed Forces, Weapons Holdings and Employment in Arms Production: Nigeria,” SIPRI, 
http://first.sipri.org/search?country=NGA&dataset=armed-forces. 
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Table 9.   Comparison of Military Personnel and Defense Expenditure.261 
 
The table shows that as of 2014, the number of personnel in the AFN is about 
80,000 and the defense spending is 0.76 percent of GDP in 2013. In comparison, South 
Africa has 62,000 personnel with a defense expenditure of about 1.29 percent of the 
GDP. The strength of the armed forces when compared to the population of both 
countries depicted in Figure 15 speaks volumes about Nigeria’s defense and security 
priorities.  
261 The Military Balance, “Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons : Commitments, Force Levels and 
Economics Routledge,” February 5, 2014, 491, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2014.871887. 
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Figure 15.  Country Comparison between Nigeria and South Africa.262 
Nigeria has a population of about 174 million people; South Africa has a 
population of about 53 million people. The population ratio is 3:1, yet the armed forces 
personnel ratio is 1.3:1, which means that there are more soldiers in South Africa per 
criminal than in Nigeria. This statistic explains why the AFN cannot fully dominate and 
contain the Boko Haram in the northeast. Notably, the Pakistan Army deployed more 
than 70,000 regular troops against the Taliban in the Pakistani North West Frontier 
Province.263    
In terms of hardware, the AFN lacks adequate operational and logistic equipment 
for operations. Figure 16 shows the equipment holdings of the AFN, but does not include 
their operational state. 
262 Countryeconomy.com, “Country Comparison South Africa vs. Nigeria,” 
http://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/south-africa/nigeria.  
263 David Khattak, “Evaluating Pakistan’s Offensives in Swat and F.A.T.A,” October 31, 2011, 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/evaluating-pakistan’s-offensives-in-swat-and-fata. 
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 Figure 16.  Nigerian Armed Forces Inventory.264 
Figure 16 shows that the Nigerian Army inventory is mostly made up of armored 
vehicles and artillery pieces, which are not suitable for low intensity operations of 
counterinsurgency.  
The Nigerian Navy also has few platforms to carry out constant patrols against 
piracy and criminal activities at sea. In the case of the Nigerian Air Force, attack 
helicopters and ground attack aircraft necessary for giving close air support for land 
forces are grossly inadequate. How can the AFN combat terrorism and still meet its 
peacekeeping obligations at the regional and global levels with limited equipment 
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holdings? To stem these problems, issues like reorganizing the armed forces and 
developing a comprehensive CT strategy easily come to mind. 
B. ADDRESSING THE SYMPTOMS: STATE SECURITY PARADIGM 
In addressing the symptoms of the security challenges examined in this thesis, the 
Nigerian government has repositioned its security agencies to better carry out their roles. 
The United States also has some role to play because the solutions will translate to better 
outcomes for U.S. security initiatives. The solutions include establishing a 
counterterrorism center of excellence, upgrading intelligence and CT capabilities, 
establishing a multinational task force against Boko Haram, and developing a national 
counterinsurgency strategy.  
1. Establish a Central Coordinating Agency: Center of Excellence 
Establishment of a central coordinating agency for combating terrorism and 
violent extremism is necessary for effective management and deployment of resources. 
For instance, after 9/11, the U.S government realized that coordination of security 
agencies was a major challenge, and it took deliberate measures to address it.265 The U.S. 
government has developed many programs and policies for improving coordination and 
connecting the dots. The office of the Director of National Intelligence was created to 
synergize the activities of all the intelligence agencies.266 The National Counterterrorism 
Center was established to enhance the capacity of the office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.267 Additionally, Presidential Policy Directives have streamlined inter-
agency coordination for effective homeland security.  
Although Nigeria has established a counterterrorism center, it is not an 
autonomous agency; it is under the office of the national security adviser.268 Such an 
265 Donald F. Kettl, System under Stress: Challenges of 21st Century Governance, 3rd ed. (Los 
Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2013), 40. 
266 Marshall Curtis Erwin, Intelligence Issues for the Congress (CRS Report No. RL33539) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf. 
267 Ibid., 17. 
268 Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, “Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism-1,” Leadership, 
March 19, 2014, http://leadership.ng/features/356955/nigerias-soft-approach-countering-terrorism-1. 
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arrangement would not effectively address issues of coordination and the effective 
management of intelligence. Nigeria needs to solicit the support and expertise of the 
United States on the CT center. If a proper CT center had been established, the 
overarching capabilities required for Nigerian security agencies to integrate with U.S. 
military advisers would have been in place. The center could also serve a regional center 
for combating terrorism. Further, U.S. mobile training teams and the U.S. Office of 
Defense Cooperation in Nigeria could easily monitor program implementation and 
measure effectiveness. 
2. Upgrade and Integrate Technical Intelligence and Surveillance 
Capability with a Limited Drone Fleet 
Proactive intelligence is essential to an effective response to terrorism. Richard 
English stresses, “Without high quality intelligence ... all aspects of state response will 
stumble ineffectively.”269 For example, intelligence played a major part in the Irish 
Republican Army’s stalemate leading to a peace process with the British government. 
Conversely, poor intelligence could have grave consequences; intelligence failures 
questioned the U.S. legitimacy and credibility in Iraq.270 A human intelligence network 
played a key role in the neutralization of Hamas leaders. 
Technical intelligence, drone surveillance, and combat drone surveillance have 
immensely assisted U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The ongoing U.S. air support for land 
operations against ISIS exemplifies the importance of technical intelligence. One of the 
core capabilities lacking in Nigeria is technical intelligence with a limited drone fleet. 
Such a capability will not only enhance force protection, it will also improve the 
effectiveness of the AFN. The beheading of Wing Commander Chimda Hedima would 
have been avoided if drones had been used for the operations. Thus, if there had been 
initial intelligence data on the approximate location of Boko Haram, the U.S. intelligence 
assistance would have yielded better results. 
269 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford,UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 132. 
270 Ibid. 
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3. Establish a Multinational Task Force against Nigeria’s Transnational 
Terrorists 
A key component in combating terrorism is partnership at regional and 
international levels. The current U.S. designation of Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist 
organization and UN sanctions against the group have set the stage for a multinational 
action. The effort by the United States and some European countries, such as the UK and 
France, to assist Nigeria is a step in the right direction. Further, the conference held in 
France called on neighboring African states to cooperate against cross-border terrorism. 
The hot spots for terrorists are the border areas between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and 
Cameroon.  
Regional partnerships between the security agencies of the neighboring countries 
have started to yield results. For instance, Cameroonian Special Forces have attacked and 
killed several members of Boko Haram.271 Similarly, Chad is actively involved in 
forging a deal with Boko Haram to release the kidnapped schoolgirls.272 These efforts are 
effective, but not coordinated. It is therefore necessary for the ministries of defense of the 
neighboring countries to explore the formation of a multinational task force to combat 
Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the region. The task force should not be limited 
to the countries neighboring Nigeria. Such a task force would be a litmus test for the 
efficacy of the future African Standby Force. 
4. Develop a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Strategy for Nigeria 
Developing a national counterinsurgency strategy would be a viable step towards 
combating terrorism and other threats to Nigeria. The strategy should describe the 
government and civil society responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law 
enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration.273 Nigeria’s current 
271 David Lewis, “Cameroon Security Forces Kill 2 Boko Haram Militants after Raid,” Reuters, June 
8, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/08/us-cameroon-boko-haram-idUSKBN0EJ0E720140608. 
272 Michael Ireland, “Nigerian Government and Boko Haram Terrorists ‘Agree to Ceasefire and 
Schoolgirls’ Release’,” Assist News Service, October 17, 2014, http://www.assistnews.net/
ansarticle.asp?URL=Stories/2014/s14100211.htm. 
273 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010, v, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf. 
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counterterrorism strategy focuses more on addressing the symptoms and does not cater to 
a broader counterinsurgency doctrine.274  
The national strategy should adopt the best practices for counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism, such as adapting to it, addressing the underlying causes; avoiding over 
militarization, using robust intelligence; respecting orthodox legal frameworks, adhering 
to established rule of law; and maintaining citizens’ trust and credibility.275 For the 
strategy to be effective, it will require the creation of separate agency for the director of 
national intelligence. The agency and the CT center should be autonomous. As a first 
step, a committee could be set up drawing members from all the security agencies to 
develop the strategy. Once developed, the security agencies would be better focused in 
their respective CT and counterinsurgency operations. 
C. ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES: HUMANITARIAN 
SECURITY PARADIGM 
Human security solutions for the insecurity in Nigeria are numerous and require 
time to achieve. Nonetheless, some of the immediate remedies that would translate into 
better outcomes for the U.S. security initiatives include education sector reforms, justice 
sector reforms, poverty eradication programs, and the prioritization of U.S. humanitarian 
assistance programs. 
1. Education Sector Reforms 
The low literacy rate among the youth of ages 15 to 25 in Nigeria calls for a 
pragmatic education sector reform. This has become more necessary because 
demographics reveal that northeastern Nigeria, ground zero of Boko Haram operations, 
suffers from the highest level of illiteracy among youth. Illiterate youths are more 
susceptible to extremist brainwashing than youths who can question the rationale for 
joining any organization. Nigeria has over the years embarked on several programs to 
revamp the education sector. Some of the programs include the Universal Basic 
274 Aminu Mohammed Umar, “Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for 
Resolving the Crisis” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 46‒52. 
275English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 146.  
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Education program, the Education Trust Fund, and the Petroleum Technology 
Development Fund.276  
The overall objectives of these programs bolster all levels of education in 
Nigeria.277 The Petroleum Technology Development Fund has a larger budget and is 
more focused on tertiary education to build capacities needed in the technology and 
petroleum industry.278 While tertiary education is desirable, the focus should be in 
striking a balance between the collapsing basic education system and spending millions 
of dollar abroad. If the basic education systems are not overhauled, no competent 
students can fill the technology drive of the Petroleum Technology Development Fund. 
Additionally, illiterate radicalized youth will continue to fuel violence and instability in 
Nigeria. 
The main cause of extremism in northern Nigeria is the proliferation of 
unregulated Koranic schools. Radical clerics at such schools easily radicalize their 
students. The Boko Haram sect has been known to use a private mosque, which has a 
Koranic school to recruit its members.279 As part of the education sector reform, the 
Nigerian government needs to take deliberate steps to reorganize and integrate the 
Koranic schools into the formal education system. Recently, the Kano state government 
integrated most of its Koranic schools with the primary education system and provided 
free tuition, uniforms, breakfast, and lunch.280 The strategy has produced positive results 
as other Koranic schools have requested to be integrated.281 Thus, the Kano model could 
be applied to most of the northern state to encourage students to go to school without 
sacrificing their religious obligations. The model will also help in managing and 
276 C. A. Ajibola and L. U. Akah L. O. Ogunjimi, “Sustenance of Education Sector Reforms in 
Nigeria through Adequate Participation by All Stake Holders,” International NGO 4, no. 4 (2009): 105. 
277 Ibid. 
278 PTDF, “Overseas Scholarship Scheme (OSS),” PTDF, http://www.ptdf.gov.ng/index.php/
scholarships/overseas. 
279 Walker, “What Is Boko Haram,” 3‒4. 




                                                 
monitoring clerics with an extremist ideology. Salary incentives could also be offered to 
the clerics to encourage them.  
2. Justice Sector Reforms 
The reformation of the justice sector to one that is more effective and accountable 
to all Nigerians will help address insecurity in Nigeria. An impartial justice system and 
rule of law is the foundation for any society or organization. It prevents chaos, anarchy, 
and crisis and regulates the daily activities of the citizenry. Additionally, it fosters respect 
for human rights.282 In Nigeria, the masses have lost faith in the justice system because 
the security agencies operate with impunity. The growth of militia across Nigeria 
suggests that the police cannot provide protection to the people. Extremist groups easily 
recruit militias.  
Another manifestation of the weak justice system is the Sharia law controversy 
among northern Nigerian states, which has been politicized and misunderstood.283 A 
secular, multiethnic, and multi-religious country cannot operate under Sharia law. The 
northern states have a significant percentage of Christians, and Sharia law does not apply 
to them.284 Thus, the federal government needs to reform the justice system to cater to 
such sensitivities. Engaging in dialogues with the religious leaders to make them 
understand that government has no vested interest is a first step. Second, respect for other 
belief systems needs to be stressed to avoid the “us and them” syndrome affecting all 
other sectors of the economy.  
Nigeria is also bedeviled with corrupt judges. Anti-graft commissions such as the 
economic and financial crime commission and the independent corrupt practices and 
other related offences commissions have not been very effective in bringing corrupt 
judges to justice. Effective justice sector reform must include the removal of corrupt 
judges. Essentially, with the improvement of the justice system, the root causes of 
282 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5. 
283 Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, 11. 
284 Ibid. 
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extremism will gradually be reduced and the U.S. security policy will have better 
outcomes. 
3. Poverty Eradication Programs 
Poverty eradication has been at the forefront of Nigeria’s development priorities. 
Despite enormous resources, many Nigerians are living in abject poverty. The Subsidy 
Re-investment and Empowerment Program, which replaced the National Poverty 
Eradication Program, has neither been effective nor reached the community that has 
urgent needs.285 The Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Program aims to harness 
the resources that would have gone into fuel subsidies for socio-economic programs and 
infrastructural development to improve the living conditions of Nigerians.286  
The major shortcoming of the program is that it focuses on showcasing a good 
political scorecard rather than on affecting the lives of the people that need the incentives. 
For instance, in the media National Poverty Eradication Program appears to be reaching 
out to the people, but in reality that is not the case. The government needs to set priorities 
on executing these programs; otherwise, more problems will be created. The process 
should be fair, transparent, and devoid of political, ethnic, or religious biases. An option 
is for the president to set up a special task force to address poverty across Nigeria based 
on statistics from the national bureau for statistics. The task forces should also include 
short, medium, and long-term goals.   
4. Prioritizing U.S. Humanitarian Assistance  
U.S. humanitarian and civil assistance programs need to be prioritized to address 
the problems that will improve security. What the United States perceives as 
humanitarian needs may not have an immediate impact on the people. A poverty-stricken 
country would prefer more food-related humanitarian assistance than the provision of 
clothes or blankets; food items would have been better for the Muslims in Djibouti during 
285 Audu Joel Samson, Haruna Paul Ogwu, and Attah Amana Philip, “Strategy for Reducing 
Unemployment in Nigeria: The Role of Informal Sector,” International Journal of Capacity Building in 
Education and Management 2, no. 1 (2013): 37. 
286 SURE-P, “Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme,” http://sure-p.gov.ng/main/
index.php/sure-p-programmes/others/programme-objectives. 
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Ramadan than the used clothes distributed by AFRICOM. Additionally, excess articles 
given to schools and hospitals may not be the exact items the schools or hospitals require. 
This argument does not mean that the items are not needed in Nigeria, but the programs 
should be problem specific. For instance, the U.S. HIV program in Nigeria for civilians 
and military personnel is successful. It could be deduced that the program has developed 
the capacity of Nigerians to fight infectious diseases. The swiftness with which the 
Nigerian health officials applied the CDC recommendations against Ebola demonstrates 
its success.  
Addressing endemic human security problems such as poverty and illiteracy 
should be a priority of the U.S. security programs. One option is to explore the best way 
for the U.S.-Nigeria Bi-national Commission to help in setting these priorities. Another 
option for the United States is to review the Millenium Challenge Corporation 
qualification criteria based on millennium challenges and not based on gross domestic 
product or World Bank classification of countries below the lower middle-income level. 
A third option is to consider reorganizing and streamlining humanitarian assistance to 
meet the aspirations of most African countries. If underlying causes of insecurity in 
Nigeria are addressed, it will be easier to identify the weakness or effectiveness of the 
U.S. security policy.  
Notably, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which 
came into force in 2010, seek to address such challenges of U.S. diplomatic engagements 
as interagency coordination and administering aid.287 Nonetheless, the first QDDR could 
not address interagency coordination problems because it was more like a wish list than a 
strategic plan.288 It is expected that the 2014 QDDR not only will speak to the issues, but 
also will prioritize U.S. humanitarian assistance for better outcomes of U.S. security 
initiatives.  
287 U.S. Department of State, “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,” November 13, 
2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153109.pdf 
288 Gerald Hyman, “Lessons for the 2014 QDDR,” CSIS, September 23, 2014, http://csis.org/
publication/lessons-2014-qddr 
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D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The 2012 U.S. strategy toward SSA encapsulates U.S. foreign policy objectives 
and guides U.S. engagements in the region. Nonetheless, when it comes down to national 
issues, the strategy becomes too broad. Further, if the United States does not have an 
established mechanism to engage with a particular country, administering security and 
humanitarian programs become a challenge. Nigeria is a mixed case because the United 
States and Nigeria have a long-standing economic, political, and security relationship. 
The United States has multiple security and humanitarian initiatives in Nigeria as the 
chapter revealed. For instance, Nigeria is among the countries receiving the largest 
amount of the HIV/AIDS assistance from the United States. Also, Nigeria has benefited 
from counterterrorism and maritime security initiatives. 
The chapter found that tradeoffs between U.S. national interests and Nigeria’s 
security problems have not been clearly determined. This problem will continue to play 
into the rhetoric versus reality narrative in U.S. foreign policy engagements. The 
bureaucracy in Washington has also played out in the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy 
in Nigeria. The Leahy law debate on where to draw the line so that Nigeria gets the much 
needed aid has been inconclusive. Further, the problem of interagency coordination 
among the multiple U.S. agencies also affects outcomes. 
At the same time, Nigeria has not done well in maintaining an operationally 
ready-armed force in terms of personnel strength, capability, and equipment holdings. 
The personnel strength of 80,000 in the AFN is grossly inadequate when compared to the 
population of 174 million people. The number suggests that Nigeria cannot fully 
dominate the ungoverned spaces in the northeast against extremism, if she is to address 
other regional or global security obligations. A lack of a robust intelligence capability and 
an autonomous counterterrorism-coordinating agency also affects outcomes of U.S. 
security initiatives. 
The best U.S. initiative matched with improved on-ground capability may not 
yield sustained outcomes if the symptoms and underlying causes are not addressed. The 
symptoms approach requires the establishment of a central coordinating agency, 
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upgrading intelligence and CT capability, establishing a multinational task force, and 
developing a comprehensive strategy. The underlying causes approach requires Nigeria 
to refocus its education sector reform, justice sector reform, and poverty eradication 





V. THESIS CONCLUSION 
U.S.-Nigerian relations typify a sinusoidal wave with many highs and lows, 
promises and failures, opportunities and misadventures. Nigeria is among the countries 
receiving the largest amount of U.S. assistance. On face value, it might raise questions 
about the effectiveness of U.S. programs, but the reality is that PEPFAR takes the highest 
percentage of U.S. assistance to Nigeria. The PEPFAR and DOD HIV programs have 
been successful as the HIV prevalence rate has decreased at the national level and among 
the military. Additionally, Nigeria’s swift action against Ebola and the subsequent 
containment of the disease is a positive outcome on the overall U.S. health initiative. 
Nevertheless, these programs must be broadened to balance education and poverty 
reduction programs. 
Furthermore, it is imperative that U.S. security assistance be delivered in a timely 
fashion. Human rights provisions enshrined in the Leahy law are the greatest obstacles to 
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria. While human rights are important, delays in resolving 
such issues could have grave consequences as can be seen with the expansion of Boko 
Haram. Additionally, occasions where the United States has delivered aid regardless of 
the dubious status of the recipient country’s security agencies, such as Colombia, send 
mixed signals to allies like Nigeria.  
Weaknesses are not exclusively attributable to mismatched assistance or delayed 
delivery of resources. Poor implementation is also a factor. In particular, the incapacity of 
Nigeria’s security agencies has been part of the reason why programs cannot achieve 
their desired outcomes. The reduction in the strength of the military by more than 40 
percent between 1985 and 2003 is inexplicable. Further, most of the military’s equipment 
is obsolete and unsuitable for counterinsurgency operations. Intelligence and CT 
capability also seem to be weak. Thus, low numerical strength coupled with a lack of 
appropriate weapons makes banishing Boko Haram and other security threats improbable 
in the near future. 
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In order to improve the outcomes of U.S. security programs, both the symptoms 
and root causes need to be addressed. For the symptoms, Nigeria needs to develop its CT 
and intelligence capability because, without intelligence, any CT efforts are most likely to 
be futile. Further, the establishment of an autonomous central coordinating body and 
comprehensive national counterinsurgency strategy will help harness the resources from 
various agencies for effective counterinsurgency operations.  
Addressing the underlying causes entails educational reforms, poverty 
eradication, and justice sector reform. These reforms will help engage the youth, increase 
their awareness, and improve their living conditions, which can guard against 
brainwashing and radicalization. For instance, the integration of the Koranic schools with 
the formal education system in Kano has started to yield positive results. The federal 
government of Nigeria needs to adopt the Kano model across the schools in the north. 
Additionally, the poverty eradication program and the justice sector reform effort require 
a major overhaul.  
To ensure a better return on its investment through effective outcomes, the United 
States must explore better ways of providing humanitarian assistance. It is important to 
consult with officials of partner countries to help prioritize what they really need. The 
U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission could be used effectively for this purpose. 
Additionally, it is hoped that the 2014 QDDR would address most of the human security 
issues raised. Future research should focus on the effect of U.S. domestic politics on 
U.S.-Nigeria relations to help ascertain what Nigeria really means to the United States. 
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